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The associated countries 
and their development 
European  Studies  No.  5,  1969  explained  the  significance  of  the  European  Community 
to  the  18  Associates and to  other states  with  which  the  Community  has  signed  agreements. 
The  aspects  of  the  Rome  Treaty  dealing  with  association,  the  first  Convention,  and  the 
two  Yaounde  conventions  were  described,  as  well  as  the  other  agreements.  Tables  showed 
the  evolution  of  Community  trade  with  these  and  other  developing  countries,  and  the 
contribution and allocation  of Community aid.  This  text  is  a continuation of the  earlier  one 
and  seeks  to  outline  some  of the  geographical  and  economic  problems,  particularly  those 
of  industrialisation,  of  the  countries  associated  under  the  Yaounde  Convention.  While 
agriculture  is  basic  to  the  economy  of almost  all  these  countries,  it  is  commonly  thought 
that  well  conceived  industrial  development  provides  the  best  way  to  more  rapid  economic 
advance. Moreover,  the moment is opportune, since on July 1, 1971  the Community abolished 
import  duties  on  developing  countries'  exports  of  manufactured  and  semi-manufactured 
goods and on some  processed  agricultural  products,  up  to  quota  levels  which  are  expected 
to  double imports of these goods from developing countries. 
The  18  Yaounde  Associates,  once  dependent  territories 
in  Africa  of  France,  Belgium  or  the  United  Kingdom 
(British Somaliland), or Trusteeships of those countries and 
of  Italy,  all  lie  within  the  tropics,  as  do  the  three 
Commonwealth countries of the East African  Community, 
associated with the European Community under the Arusha 
Agreement.  As  such,  they  belong  to  the  tropical  world,  a 
realm within  which modem development has usually  been 
slower  than  in  temperate  lands,  and  in  which  the  best 
means of development are less  obvious or understood, and 
where  success  is  more elusive.  Winter never comes  to  the 
tropics so that interruptions to plant growth are not caused 
by seasonally low temperatures. Rainfall and related ground 
water supplies are far greater limiting factors on agriculture 
and livestock herding. 
Outside  the  rather  restricted  area  of  the  equatorial 
climate (approximately 8°N-8°S) rainfall is  highly seasonal. 
Even  within  the  rather narrow equatorial  zone it is  often 
inadequate,  notably  in  southern  Togo  and  Dahomey,  in 
Tanzania and Kenya.  Beyond  the  equatorial zone are the 
monsoonal  and  tropical  climate  zones,  where  rainfall  is 
highly  seasonal  and  where,  as  latitude  increases  rainfall 
diminishes sharply  and the rainy season  shortens.  Even in 
the  equatorial  climate,  but  even  more  so  in  the  tropical 
areas,  rainfall  is  highly  variable.  It varies  from  year  to 
year, not just in total amount (which is not a very informa-
tive  figure)  but in  the  nature  of its  incidence  throughout 
the  year. 
Agriculture in the tropics is  thus  hazardous climatically, 
for  the  right  moment  to  sow  is  rarely  obvious.  Several 
sowings  may  be  necessary  by peoples  who  can ill afford 
the  seed,  and there are  similar problems over the  harvest. 
Constantly high  temperatures  encourage a  proliferation  of 
pests from viruses,  bacteria and fungi,  to  insects, birds and 
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rodents.  Moreover,  tropical  soils  are  poorer  and  more 
fragile  than  those  of  temperate  regions  and  need  to  be 
cultivated  with  great  care.  In  particular,  laterite  and 
lateritic  soils  causing  widespread  infertility  present  acute 
problems  to  tropical  agriculture.  Natural  vegetation  in 
Africa has not provided many useful plants to the cultivator, 
except for the oil palm and a few  others, and for some trees 
of commercial value. 
Lastly,  in  this  outline  of  some  of  the  major  physical 
problems  of the tropics  a  unique affliction  of Africa must 
be  mentioned,  the  tsetse  fly.  Looking  somewhat  like  the 
European house  fly,  the tsetse  occurs  only on the  African 
mainland, between  l4°N and l4°S, where there is  sufficient 
woodland or forest to provide  the shade it needs.  Riverine 
or swamp  vegetation  will  extend  its  realm  into  otherwise 
dry  areas,  and  there  are  many species  of tsetse  (Glossina 
spp.),  whose  habitats  or  areas  differ  somewhat,  though 
they  all  may  carry the  killing  trypanosomes.  These  cause 
sleeping  sickness  in  man,  no  longer  a  serious  menace 
thanks  to  a  number  of effective  drugs.  But  as  the  carrier 
of the  dreaded  nagana  disease,  the  tsetse  fly  brings  death 
quickly  to  cattle  and  horses.  The  economic  and  envi-
ronmental significance of the tsetse lies  in the fact that the 
large  and  most  useful  breeds  of cattle  must  be  kept  out 
of  the  tsetse  areas,  which  are  the  areas  which  would 
otherwise  be  most  suitable  for  cattle  because  of  their 
greater  rainfall  and  feeding  potential.  Meanwhile,  cattle 
are kept in the driest zones,  and so  must move  frequently 
to  find  even  the  barest  nourishment  and  water,  and  to 
escape  the  tsetse  which  advances  with  the  rain  and  the 
new season's foliage. 
Yet the problems of the tropics are by no  means purely 
physical;  they  are  also  human.  Furthermore  they  are not 
purely African, but they are, in general, more acute in that Estimate  Annual 
Full  of  Rate  of 
Population  Increase  Associate  1%9  1963-1%9 
(Thousands)  Per cent 
Burundi  3,475  2.0 
Cameroon  5,680  2.1 
Central African Republic  1,518  2.5 
Chad  3,510  1.5 
Congo  (B)  880  1.3 
Congo (K)  17,100  2.2 
Dahomey  2,640  2.9 
Gabon  485  1.0 
Ivory Coast  4,195  2.3 
Madagascar  6,643  n. a. 
Mali  4,881  1.9 
Mauritania  1,140  2.0 
Niger  3,909  2.7 
Rwanda  3,500  3.0 
Senegal  3,780  2.2 
Somalia  2,730  2.7 
Togo  1,815  2.5 
Upper Volta  5,278  2.1 
a  Compare  Britain  $1,451  and  the  EEC  $1,592  (1968). 
continent.  The  far  greater  densities  of  population  in  the 
valleys  of Monsoon  Asia  than in  Tropical Africa,  though 
partly explicable in terms  of physical geography, are more 
the result of different social, political and economic systems 
and attitudes.  These  have  encouraged and enabled  greater 
mastery  of  the  perhaps  less  difficult  Asian  environment. 
Again,  continuing  the  comparison  with  other  regions  of 
the tropics, whilst the Caribbean has been quite intensively 
developed  (in  part  by  peoples  of  African  descent), 
Amazonia  remains  even  more  intractable  than  most 
African  areas. 
Tropical  Africa  remains,  in  general,  a  thinly  peopled 
area, where  the impact of man on the environment is  not 
yet  intensive,  except  in  a  very  few  areas.  Outside  the 
educated  and  the  town  dwellers,  most  Africans  are  still 
largely  local  subsistence farmers,  growing  cash  crops  only 
where  the  infrastructure  for  marketing  and  export  exists 
(Fig.  1),  where  wants  have  been  stimulated  and  taxes 
impinge.  Otherwise,  fallow  farming,  communal  land 
ownership  and  the  extended  family  are  severe  restrictions 
upon initiative, and prevail in a situation where the physical 
environment  demands  much  energy  to  tame  it.  Islam, 
powerful  in  West  and  East  Africa,  is  also  commonly 
thought to be an obstacle to progress, more in its institutional 
consequences,  such  as  attitudes  to  women,  western 
education, technology, land and the law,  rather than in its 
original dogma. 
There  is  a  multitude  of African  languages,  with  indig-
enous lingua franca limited to Swahili in coastal East Africa 
and  to  Hausa in  the  eastern  interior of West Africa.  The 
"tribe",  which  may  or  may  not  coincide  with  racial, 
linguistic  or  other  groups,  is  still  the  first  loyalty  to  the 
vast  majority,  even  to  most  elites  in  their  moments  of 
strife and stress.  National loyalty was  born in anti-colonia-
lism,  the  celebration  of independence,  and the  pursuit  of 
economic development;  it competes acutely with  tribal and 
regional loyalties. 
Meanwhile,  the  population  of  the  fully  Associated 
Countries is  low, but growing quite rapidly in certain cases, 
as  the  table  below  shows.  For  most,  their  demographic 
problems  are  a  low  or very  low  total  population,  a  very 
low  per  capita  income  (among  the  lowest  in  the  world), 
with  the  consequence  of  very  small  local  markets,  the 
more so  as  they are poorly provided with  the basic  trans-
port  media,  marketing,  education  and  information.  And, 
whilst  colonial  rule  has  provided  them  with  the  outline 
framework,  institutions  and  infrastructure  of  the  modem 
state,  it  has  left  them  separated  by  different  official 
languages,  trading  zones  and  numerous  currencies,  many 
being  inconvertible. 
Density  Gross  Gross Domestic  Product 
Area  Domestic  Per  cent  by  sector 
in  per  Product  sq.km  sq.km  $per  I  Secondary I 
1969  capita a  Primary  Tertiary 
27,834  125  43  74.5  5.9  19.4 
475,442  12  136  46.5  14.1  39.4 
622,984  2  103  51.0  19.2  29.8 
1,284,000  3  59  60.7  9.2  30.1 
342,000  3  115  31.4  27.4  41.2 
2,345,409  7  61  36.2  36.1  27.7 
112,622  23  68  54.2  13.6  32.2 
267,667  2  384  29.8  35.1  35.1 
322,463  13  237  43.8  16.4  39.8 
587,041  11  104  49.2  14.7  36.1 
1,240,000  4  60  57.7  13.4  28.9 
1  ,030,  700  1  115  42.7  47.2  10.1 
1,267,000  3  75  66.2  12.0  21.8 
26,338  133  43  74.7  5.9  19.4 
196,192  19  163  34.3  16.0  49.7 
637,657  4  n.a.  n.a.  n. a.  n. a. 
56,000  32  76  56.8  8.9  34.3 
274,200  19  52  62.4  11.4  16.2 
The need for 
industrial development 
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A  major  debate  between  economists  concerned  about 
under-developed countries has been whether to concentrate 
very  scarce  resources  for  development  in  agriculture,  or 
whether to  concentrate on industry. The latter tends  to  be 
favoured  as  likely to  bring quicker returns,  because it can 
operate  with  fewer  institutional  and social  restraints.  It is 
urged  by almost  all  African  leaders  for  this  reason,  as  a 
symbol  of modernisation  and  advance,  and  because  they 
often  regard  agricultural  reform as  more  or less  hopeless, 
certainly in the short run. 
Yet the antithesis is a false one, because industry (without 
assuming  the  development  of an  export  market)  will  not 
find  an  adequate  market  unless  the  national  population, 
which  currently obtains most  of its, income  from  farming, 
can increase its income sufficiently to  buy industry's goods. 
So  in  varying  proportions,  according  to  the  special 
circumstances of each country (area,  population, resources, 
infrastructure  etc.),  there  must  be  both  improvement  of 
agricultural production,  processing  and marketing,  and the 
development  of  industry.  In  some  cases,  these  can  be 
combined,  e.g.  in  the  improvement  of  cotton  cultivation 
and the  development  of textile  and  clothing  manufacture, 
or  in  sugar  cultivation,  refining  and  manufacture.  Both 
these  provide substitutes for imports, and so  should be net 
savers of foreign exchange, though it should be remembered 
that foreign exchange will be needed to build the factories, 
provide  the  equipment  and  pay  for  foreign  technical 
assistance, unless aid is  forthcoming. Even then, the finished 
product, protected by tariffs from foreign  competition, will 
very  likely  be  more  costly  and  of a  poorer  quality  than 
imports. 
Manufacturing  industries  are  sought  as  a  means  of 
diversifying  economies,  and this  they have done.  However 
each  industry  must  be  economically  justified  at  it~ 
establishment, and remain so during its continued existence. 
This  criterion,  rarely  if  ever  applied  with  vigour,  is  the 
only  one  for  economic  health;  it  was  certainly  the  way 
the  industrial  countries  achieved  their success.  Other aims, 
relating  to  the  establishment  of  new  industry,  such  as 
providing employment for school leavers and teaching new 
skills,  are  better  left  to  the  implementation  rather  than 
selection stage. 1. COMMERCIAL 
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8  $20m  . 
$  100m  . 
$  500m. 3. PRINCIPAL  EXPORTS  OF AFRICAN  ASSOCIATED  STATES 
Principal 
Commodities 
Total Value 
BURUNDI  1968 
CAMEROON  1967 
CENT. AFRIC. REPUB. 
1968 
CHAD  1969 
CONGO  1965 
DAHOMEY  1968 
GABON  1968 
IVORY  COAST  1968 
MADAGASCAR  1968 
MALl  1968 
MAURITANIA  1967 
NIGER  1969 
RWANDA  1969 
SENEGAL  1968 
SOMALIA  1968 
TOGO  1969 
UPPER  VOLTA  1969 
ZAIRE  1969 
20  40  60  80 
100  200  300  400  million$ 
Meat 
W@  Others 
Uranium 
~~ 
~oundtruts ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ·. ftiiiestOCk I  Others 
Hides 
Others 
l  Others 
Source :Based on Statistics in Europa Yearbook :  ..  Africa- South of the Sahara 1971  " Problems of 
industrial development 
In  theory,  land  is  plentiful  but  in  fact  most industries 
are located in  ports  (e.g.  Dakar  and  Abidjan),  often  very 
near  to  the  quays  because  of the  use  of imports,  and so 
give  rise  to  congestion.  For  this,  and  to  encourage  more 
balanced  national  and  regional  development,  the  location 
of industries  in  some of the smaller (but not small) towns 
is  being  increasingly  advocated,  as  well  as  the  encour-
agement  there  and  in  the  large  towns  of  some  smaller 
industries. Industrial estates are often promoted by national 
or  provincial  authorities,  and  could  most  effectively  be 
helped,  where  appropriate,  by Community loans or grants. 
Elsewhere,  before  an  industry  (or  a  mine)  can  be 
established the whole environment must often be modified. 
The bush must be  cleared  and drained,  power,  water  and 
housing  provided,  as  well  as  medical  and  social  facilities. 
Raw  materials  are  normally  very  important,  despite  their 
declining  relative  significance  in  older  industrialised 
countries  (Fig.  2).  There  are  commonly  problems  of 
irregular,  variable or interrupted supplies  of raw materials 
(e.g.  of  fruit  for  canning,  timber  for  processing),  whilst 
electrical power is  often interrupted, causing great problems 
to industries such as metal refining or soluble coffee  manu-
facture.  Perhaps  the most  fundamental  long-term  problem 
is that, whilst most new industries in the African Associated 
Countries  must  perforce  be  the  fairly  simple  processing 
ones,  world  markets  are  increasingly  requiring  more 
"sophisticated"  products.  Consequently,  if  world  markets 
are being sought (and they are the only ones that are large), 
then cocoa-producing countries like the Ivory Coast should 
produce  a  cocoa liqueur rather than chocolate,  the timber 
producers  such  as  Congo  (B)  and  Gabon  should  produce 
unusual  furniture  or at  least  furniture  in  unusual  woods. 
(Fig.  3).  Likewise,  African  soap  producers  should  develop 
and use  local essential  oils,  such as  jasmine.  Mali already 
cans  tamarind  and  guava  juices  and  awaits  an  overseas 
market.  Of all  raw  materials,  the  oil  and  natural  gas  of 
Nigeria, possibly soon to be an Associate, should stimulate 
broad range of widely  distributed  chemical  industries. 
Labour  problems  have  diminished  as  countries  have 
developed  generally  and  industrially,  but  managers  and 
skilled  workers  are  still  few.  Here is  a  field  in which  the 
Community  helps  with  training  in  Europe  and  in  Africa, 
but in which  it could and should do  much more.  It could 
also  help  with  training  for  better  machine  maintenance, 
improvement  of technical  education,  and  help  to  improve 
the quality and relevance of all  education.  In the French-
speaking  countries  this  is  still  overwhelmingly  France  and 
French  -oriented. 
The  most  obvious  field  for  Community  help  is  in  the 
technical  and  financial  aspects  of  industry.  Indigenous 
capital resources are small, and what is available commonly 
goes  into  land,  private building,  road transport and family 
celebrations,  rather than into  industrial enterprises.  Conse-
quently,  the  state  almost  inevitably  must  act  as  "capital-
organiser"; it is the agent through which capital is obtained, 
and  from  which  it  is  also  in  some  degree  provided.  In 
varying  ways  it  either  wholly  runs  industrial  enterprises 
(as  in  socialist  states  like  Mali,  Tanzania and Congo  [B]), 
or  by  participation  in  mixed  companies  (part-state  and 
part-private  enterprise)  in  many  countries.  Almost  all 
countries have always had certain state-run enterprises, such 
as railways, since early colonial times. 
The second Yaounde Convention  of 1969,  in force until 
1975,  stresses  industrialisation  for  its  inherent  importance, 
and as  part of a  diversification policy in  ex-French  Africa 
where  guaranteed  prices  and  quota  arrangements  for 
certain agricultural  produce had to  end.  African industries 
and contractors are given a  10-15  per cent preference over 
European firms  when  certain development contracts  in the 
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Associates  are awarded. The European Development Fund 
and  the  European  Investment  Bank  have  been  provided 
with  increased  funds,  and  encouraged  to  make  industrial 
loans  or  grants,  whilst  the  Bank  has  been  specifically 
encouraged  to  invest in African firms.  The Fund may use 
local  banks  as  their agents  in  helping  small  and medium-
scale  industrial  projects.  More  industrial  experts  will  be 
provided,  and financial  help will  be  given  with  trade fairs 
and similar promotional enterprises of the Associated. 
On July 1,  1971, the Community, within substantial quota 
limits,  abolished import duties  on manufactured and semi-
manufactured articles coming from all developing countries, 
in line with the proposals of the United Nations Conference 
on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD)  held  in  New 
Delhi  in  1968.  The  abolition  of these  import duties  may 
ultimately  widen  the  market  for  simple  textiles,  refined 
minerals  and most  processed  agricultural  produce.  Never-
theless,  the  immediate  benefit  will  accrue  to  the  more 
developed industries of Latin America and Asia.  However, 
the Community certainly still offers the easiest international 
market for the Yaounde Associates. 
Trade  between EEC and associated African States 
Country 
Burundi 
Cameroon (1968) 
Central African Republic (1968) 
Chad (1968) 
Congo-Brazzaville  (1968) 
Congo-Kinshasa (1967) 
Dahomey (1967) 
Gabon (1968) 
Ivory Coast (1967) 
Madagascar (1968) 
Mali (1968) 
Mauritania (1968) 
Niger (1967) 
Rwanda (1968) 
Senegal (1968) 
Somalia (1967) 
Togo (1968) 
Upper Volta (1968) 
I 
Imports I Exports 
from  EEC  to EEC 
per cent  per cent 
n. a. 
71 
77 
64 
76 
55 
77 
74 
72 
76 
38 
59 
60 
37 
71 
34 
50 
56 
n. a. 
70 
45 
76 
64 
58 
61 
49 
65 
40 
28 
62 
70 
28 
76 
36 
82 
19 
Source:  "Africa  South  of  the  Sahara"  (Europa  Year  Book,  1971). 
As  so  many African  countries have  small  total  popula-
tions,  and all  its  peoples  are poor, it is  often  argued  that 
countries  should  establish  joint  industries.  Many  such 
proposals  have  been  made,  most  notably  by  the  United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa at Addis Ababa, 
which  has investigated  the prospects  inter  alia  in iron and 
steel,  cement,  chemicals  and textiles.  Such  proposals  have 
foundered  on the economic nationalism of countries which 
want their  own factories,  and so  have  tended  to  fund the 
same industries,  e.g.  cement.  Prospective partners who  are 
even  weaker  and poorer would  lose  revenue  from  import 
duties,  and probably  pay more  for  the  new  and probably 
inferior  product  from  its  stronger  partner.  The  poorer 
partner would  lose  an  employment  outlet,  a  prospect  no 
politician  dare  accept.  Such  were  the  complaints  up  to 
1960  when  Dakar in Senegal  had most of the industry of 
French West  Africa.  More  recently,  there  have  been  the 
similar complaints of Tanzania and Uganda against Kenya. 
In some  cases  it may  be possible  to  establish  part of the 
manufacture in  one country and part in  another,  but this 
is  rarely  economically  possible  or  geographically  realistic. 
The  Community  should  nevertheless  help  and  encourage, 
where  appropriate  and  agreed,  the  establishment  of  joint 
industries  in  its  Associates.  This  might  also  include  joint oil and gas pipelines, and oil refineries.  And now that such 
a coastal state as Sierra Leone, with but 2,5  million people, 
has  a  mini-refinery,  there would seem  as  much a  case  for 
an international inland refinery  in e.g.  Fort Lamy, fed  by 
pipeline-conveyed crude oil from Nigeria or Gabon. 
The character of 
industrial development 
Industries in the Yaounde Associates,  as in other under-
developed countries,  may  be  classified  in many ways.  One 
is  to  look  at  their  national  aims,  of  which  there  are 
four. 
(a) The local processing of local raw materials before export 
This  was  an early  and often essential  function  to make 
export  possible,  most notably  of copper  from  the Congo 
(K) where even rich copper ores contain only 4-8  per cent 
copper  and  are  located  far  inland.  Hence  waste  must  be 
largely  eliminated  by  local  refining.  Likewise,  groundnut 
oil  is  increasingly  extracted  locally,  fruit  is  canned  or 
otherwise  preserved,  timber is  sawn  and further  processed 
or  peeled  for  veneer  and  plywood,  and  cocoa  beans 
converted  to  "couverture", "neats", cocoa  butter and even 
chocolate.  Many  of  these  represent  stages  of  industrial 
processing, from the essential removal of waste to carrying 
out  in  the  production  area  some  of  the  final  processing. 
More  of "the value  added"  accrues  to  the  Associate,  the 
industry is not limited by the usually small size of the home 
market  because  it  is  producing  for  export,  and  national 
revenue  gains.  Yet  the  scope  is  limited,  unless  such 
industries  can  either  compete  against  established  proces-
sors  or  develop  such  new  products  as  suggested  earlier. 
(b)  The  local  processing  of  local  raw  materials  for  the 
home market 
These  are the  import-substitution industries,  such as  the 
cement  factory  near Dakar in  Senegal,  cotton  textile  and 
clothing mills, soap works and soluble coffee plant (Abidjan, 
Ivory Coast) and the like.  Their products  should improve 
as  purchasing  power  increases,  but  all  too  often  their 
goods  are  more  costly,  of poorer  quality  and less  variei 
than  the  imports which would  otherwise  come  in.  Import 
duties  are  also  lost to  the  state,  although precious  foreign 
exchange is  saved. 
(c)  The  local  processing  of some  local  raw  materials  and 
some  imports  for  the  home  market,  with  the  hope  of 
eventually  finding  all  or  most  raw  materials  locally 
These  are  semi-import  substitution  industries  and  are 
typical  of  the  many  cigarette  factories,  shoe,  sack,  soft-
drink  and  bulk-beer  producers.  The  same  criteria  apply 
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as in the previous category, with  frequent disappointments 
over local supplies. 
(d)  The  local  processing  or  assembly  of  imported  goods 
for  the home market 
Such  are  the  flour  mills  of  Dakar,  Abidjan  or  Fort 
Lamy,  and  car  and  truck  assembly  plants  at  Abidjan. 
They are the import counterpart to the first  group.  Again, 
some of the value added by labour accrues  to the Mrican 
country, but in this case the industry is  very much limited 
by the  size  of the  home  market,  as  are all  the last three 
categories. That small market may also prefer the imported 
article  if it  or something  similar  is  still  imported  or  can 
be obtained by smuggling. The potential for further import 
or  partial  import substitution  industries  is  small  in  those 
countries  which  have  most  industries,  i.e.  Senegal,  Ivory 
Coast,  Congo  (K),  Arusha-associated  Kenya,  and  in  the 
as  yet  unassociated  Ghana  and  Nigeria  (unratified  asso-
ciation  of  1966).  There  is  still  some  scope  for  them  in 
Cameroon,  Uganda,  Tanzania  and  Madagascar.  Prospects 
are not good in the other countries with small populations 
and little industry. 
There is  manifestly a  need to  develop  specialist products 
but  these  demand  education,  managerial  skills  and enter-
prise which are rare in the underdeveloped countries. The 
best  hope  lies,  perhaps,  in  the  further  development  of 
hydro-electric  power,  oil  and  natural  gas  supplies,  and 
their  progressive  distribution  by  grid  and  pipeline.  This 
should  make  existing  industries  more  competitive,  be  the 
bases for the initial production of fertilizers,  pesticides and 
plastics,  and  the  later  production  of  caustic  soda  and 
amonia.  Small  inland  and international  oil  refineries  have 
also  been  mentioned.  The  necessary  infrastructure  would 
be  costly  and  beyond  the  resources  of  the  Associates  or, 
probably,  of the  companies.  Here is  something worthy  of 
consideration  by the United Nations,  the Community,  the 
oil  companies  operating  in  the  Associates,  and  those 
countries.  For,  with  cheaper  electrical  energy,  oil  and 
natural gas, a real industrial take-off might occur. 
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Europe's peripheral regions 
Whatever a  region's  aspirations,  realism  dictates  that not all  locations  are  of equivalent 
economic attraction. Over Western Europe the  benefits of economic expansion and prosperity 
hav~ thus  no~ been  ~venly  ~pread. Least  favoured  are  the  predominantly  rural,  outlying  or 
perzpheral regwns whzch untzl recently have remained geographically isolated and economically 
neglected.  The  problems  of  one  peripheral  region,  Brittany,  have  already  been  analysed 
(European  Studies  No.  12)  and  future  studies  will  focus  on  those  of  Scotland  and  the 
Mezzogiorno.  The  present article  takes  an  overall  view  l1f  the  historical  imbalance  between 
cor~ and  periphery  and examines  the  problems and  prospects of some  of Europe's  outlying 
regzons. 
Core v.  periphery 
.  T~  .balance  of  both  population  and  wealth  in Europe 
IS  tippmg  more  and  more  towards  the  centre  and  away 
from  the  periphery.  In  face  of this  process  of economic 
centralisation,  it  is  feared  that  the  existing  disparities 
between  favoured  and less-favoured  regions  will  be  accen-
tuated.  Today, the fundamental geographical reality  in  the 
regional  economic  organisation  of Western  Europe  is  the 
dominance  of  a  closely  inter-linked  urban-industrial  core 
region  or "junction  zone" extending  in a  great arc across 
the  continent  between  Manchester,  Paris,  the  Ruhr  and 
Mila~. This  economic  heartland,  although relatively  small, 
contams  about half the population  of the  area  encompas-
sing  by  the  member  states  of  the  EEG  and  EFT  A  but 
accounts  for more than two-thirds  of its  total production. 
Remote  from  this  mainstream  of  social  and  economic 
life.  are  a  ~umber of  poorly  developed,  rural  peripheral 
r~gions  whtch  for  the  most  part  occupy  the  maritime 
littoral of Western Europe. But far from being just isolated 
European  outposts,  territorially  these  designated  "develop-
ment"  zones  may  cover  major  parts  of  their  respective 
national  areas  (Fig.  1).  The  lower  level  of  activity  and 
income  at  the  periphery  of  Western  Europe  can  to  a 
certain  extent be accounted  for  by natural factors  such  as 
difficult  terrain,  poor  soils,  unfavourable  climate  and  the 
like.  Mo~e often,  however,  many  of these  outlying  regions 
are  handtcapped  by  the  mere  fact  of geographic  distance 
from their own national centres of population. This problem 
of geographical  isolation  is  above  all  emphasised  by  the 
configuratiOn  of Europe, itself a  "peninsula  of peninsulas" 
each  extending  from  the  main  body  of the  continent  far 
outward  into  adjacent  seas.  In  tum,  remoteness  and  dif-
ficulty  of  access  have  opposed  the  intrusion  of  outside 
infi?ences  and  historically  served  to  preserve  distinctive 
:regi~nal cul~res ~s in the Celtic fringe  of Atlantic Europe. 
IneVItably, thts remforces the sense  of physical separateness 
already felt in many peripheral regions. 
National v.  regional  scalel 
Levels of economic development tend to be lowest in tae 
regions furthest removed from the core areas which emerg-
ed  as  the  main  European  centres  of urban  and industrial 
activity.  Applied on a  national scale,  such a  generalization 
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poses  an  immediate  paradox.  Ranked  according  to  per 
capita  income  in  1968,  the  countries  of  the  northern 
periphery, Sweden  ($3,230),  Denmark ($2,540)  and Norway 
($2,360  achieve  respectively  first,  third  and  fifth  positions 
whilst  the  southern  peninsula  countries  of  the  Mediter-
ranean,  Greece  ($860),  Spain  ($770)  and  Portugal 
($550)  occupy  the  three  lowest positions 1. Within  Scandi-
navia,  Finland  ($1,710),  doubly  peripheral  both  geograph-
ically  and  politically,  proves  the  exception.  Italy  ($1 ,390), 
similarly  exceptional  amongst the  Mediterranean countries, 
nevertheless is  only marginally better placed overall, a  low 
ranking largely attributable to the weight of inherited prob-
lems  of the retarded Mezzogiomo. 
This  observed  division  of  European  countries  on  the 
basis  of per capita  income  closely  reflects  levels  of social 
and  economic  development.  Its  relevance  to  the  problem 
of  peripheral  regions  relates  not  only  to  a  more  real 
appreciation  of  the  scale  of regional  poverty  within  dif-
ferent  countries,  but  also  to  the  capacity  for  effective 
regional  action  which  is  dependent  upon  the  level  of 
national  resources.  In  the  poorer  countries  of  Southern 
Europe,  regional  disparities  are much wider:  large  regions 
show  per  capita  incomes  less  than  two-thirds  of  their 
respective  national averages.  For example in Italy in  1966, 
the  regional  per  capita  index  (Italy= 100)  of  66  for  the 
South  contrasted  with  140  for  the  North-West.  By  com-
parison,  deviations  from  the  mean  were  much  less  in 
Norway, with indices  averaging  around 85  for the  problem 
northern  provinces  to  120  for the Oslo  region.  Differences 
in  this  respect  between  richer  and  poorer  countries  are 
even more pronounced than apparent at first sight. Most of 
the  poorest  rural  regions  in  North-West  Europe  are  very 
sparsely  populated whilst  large parts of those in  Southern 
Europe  are  on  the  contrary  densely  populated.  The 
previously  cited  examples  of  Norway  and  Italy  clearly 
underline  the  contrast.  North  Norway  has  an  average 
population  density  of 4  per sq.  km.  Covering  35  per cent 
of Norway's land area, the region accounts for only  12  per 
cent of the national population (totalling nearly 4 million) 
and contributes  some  9  per cent  of the  national  income. 
Southern Italy on the other hand, with an average popula-
tion  density  of  170  per  sq.  km.,  covers  40  per  cent  of 
Italy's  land  area,  accounts  for  38  per  cent  of  the  total 
population  (over  54  million)  but contributes  only  25  per 
cent of the national income. 
1  Per  capita  income  in  US  Dollars  for  other  West  European 
countries  in  1968  as  follows:  Switzerland  2,790;  France  2,530; 
Iceland  2,240;  West  Germany  2,200;  Belgium  2,160;  Luxembourg 
2,130;  Netherlands  1,960;  UK  1  ,850;  Austria  1  ,550;  Ireland  1  ,070. 
Cf.  USA  4,380. Problems and  prospects 
~he general  problems  of  dominantly  rural  peripheral 
regwns have been referred to in a previous article ("Region-
al  Problems  in  Britain  and  the  EEC,"  European  Studies 
No: 9).  Long condemned as the materially worse-off regions, 
their  problems can be  comprehensively  defined  as  poverty 
by  comparison with more fortunate areas;  poverty through 
lack  of  opportunity  often  stemming  in  the  past  simply 
from a  lack of resources;  but above all poverty exacerbat-
ed  by  the  high  agricultural  dependence  of  regional 
economies  retarded  by  out-dated  structures.  Traditionally, 
the only solution has  been  emigration,  often on a  massive 
scale  and  accompanied  inevitably  by  further  deterioration 
in  the social  and economic infrastructure. 
A  growing awareness and concern since the War for  the 
plight  of these  peripheral  regions  has  led  to the  develop-
ment <;>f  v~rious state regional policies designed to galvanise 
new  hfe  mto  such  problem  areas  (see  "Regional  Policy 
in  the  European  Community",  European  Studies  No.  10). 
More recently at a  supra-national level,  active  discussion 2 
has focused on how to enable geographically remote regions 
to  participate  fully  in  the  advantages  deriving  not  only 
from  natiOnal  but  the  larger  European  market  in  order 
!O  prom?te  ~ffective  inte~-re¥ional  economic  unity.  State 
~nterventwn m  ea~h. case  IS  ~Imed at creating social parity 
m  standards  of  hvmg  and  m  the  long  term  establishing 
a  viable  basis  for  economic  growth.  Problems,  both  in 
nature  and  scale,  vary  from  region  to  region  as  do  the 
options  ~vailable  for  future  development.  The  following 
case studies on the problems and prospects of three periph-
eral  regions  illustrate  such  contrasts. 
North-Norway 
Physical  geography  imposes  isolation  upon  much  of 
Norway.  Scattered  settlement,  long  distances  coupled  with 
unfavo~rable.  climatic and topographic conditions  give  rise 
to special  r~gional problems. North Norway, comprising the 
three  provmces  of  Nordland,  Troms  and  Finmark,  lies 
almost wholly to the north of the Arctic circle (Fig.  2)  But. 
for  the  warming  Gulf Stream  along  its  coast,  the  region 
would  suffer  even  harsher  extremes  of  climate  normally 
found  so  far  north.  This  long  relatively  narrow  strip  of 
!and,  dominated  by  high  mountains  and  plateaux,  broken 
m  turn  by  deep  fiords,  forms  a  distinctive  part  of  the 
problem  Scandinavian  north  stretching  across  three  states 
and known  as  N ordkalotten. 
The geographical  concentration of population and econ-
omic.  activity  into  the metropolitan  south-east  of Norway, 
focusmg  on  the  Oslo  agglomeration  which  alone  accounts 
for  nearly  20  per  ~ent of  the  country's  population,  has 
been  tJ,e  most  persistent  trend  in  modern  times.  Remote 
from  this  core  area,  and  greatly  handicapped  by  hitherto 
poorJ~ developed  communication links,  the dispersed  com-
~umh~s of the  n~rth re~ain overdependent upon  primary 
mdustnes  undergomg  radical  transformation  or in  decline. 
Most  of the  region's  population  reside  in coastal  or fiord 
districts,  with  about 40  per cent actually  living  on islands. 
Regional  population  growth  is  largely  restricted  to  the 
twelve North Norwegian towns and their environs  account-
ing  today for almost  half the  population.  Trom;!<1,  with  a 
population  of  36,340  in  1968,  is  the  largest  regional 
centre.  Away  from  these  few  urban  centres,  typical  agri-
c~ltural and fishing areas have experienced declining popula-
tiOns.  As  a  result  of  the  inevitable  drift  to  the  towns 
particularly to the south, North Norway is the only  regio~ 
which  shows  a  migration  deficit  with  all  other  regions. 
Despite remaining a net exporter of population losing some 
two  or three  thousand  per  annum,  the  region's  relatively 
2  Council  of  Europe  Symposi~m on  Peripheral  European  Regions, 
Brest  7-lOth  May,  1970.  Resolutions  ("Brest  Declaration")  taken  up 
at  sp.e<:ial  sessions. of  the  Council  of  Europe  European  Conference 
of  Mm1sters  resons1ble  for  regional  Planning  Bonn  9-llth  September 
1970.  • 
high  birth rate has  nevertheless  enabled an overall  rate of 
population growth almost equal to that achieved nationally. 
Between  1960-1970,  the  North's  population  increased  by 
6.9 per cent compared with 7.9 per cent for the country as a 
whole.  Such  rates,  however,  are in  complete contrast with 
the  exceptional  growth  of over  37  per cent  registered  by 
the  province of Akershus  which encircles  Oslo. 
T~e.  ~?rth was  for long regarded as an area offering no 
possibilities  for  development  beyond  those  associated 
with  the  fishing  industry.  Until  relatively  late  during  the 
present  century  little  capital  was  invested  in this  part  of 
Norway which, in turn, prejudiced the region's potential for 
future  development.  During  the first  half of the  twentieth 
century,  the  main  basis  for  limited  economic  growth  has 
been  the  exploitation  of  natural  resources  timber  fish 
ores and to an increasing extent hydro-electrlc powe; used 
largely  in  the  production  of  metals.  These  natural 
~eso~rces,  mostly  found  in  remote  areas,  provide  the 
livelihood  of  small,  scattered  communities  established 
around processing plants, but where the demand for labour 
must  decrease  with  progressive  modernisation.  Equally 
economic  viability  depends  upon  adequate  local  and 
r~gional in~rastructures provided only at disproportionately 
htgh costs m  sparsely settled areas. 
The final  stages  of World  War II brought a  major set-
back  to  the  North  when  large  parts  of  the  region  were 
totally laid  waste causing a  massive  exodus  of population. 
The  period  of  comprehensive  reconstruction  and  settle-
ment  between  1945-1950  focused  new  attention  on  the 
region's  socio-economic  problems  and led to the establish-
ment  of a  special  North  Norway  Regional  Development 
Programme,  1951-1961.  Problems  of unemployment  (with 
only  9  per  cent  of  the  national  work-force  the  region 
nonetheless  in  1955  had  38  per cent  of the  ~ountry's un-
employed  workers,  a  figure  still  at 24  per cent  in  1965) 
depopulation,  and  inadequate  services  were  tackled  b; 
stimulatin!? regional potential where it existed.  This growth 
centre policy was  supported  by measures  to assist  residual 
populations  in  problem  areas  and  transfer  grants  to  en-
courage  labour mobility  in  an  attempt  to  promote  better 
regional  balance. 
. The  cha~ge to  mo_re  capital  intensive  forms  of produc-
tion hand m  hand with the development of new industries 
has  brought  marked  economic  progress.  Nowhere  is  this 
better illustmted than in  the radical  re-organisation  of the 
fishing  industry.  Almost  half  the  country's  fishermen  are 
from  North  Norway,  although  the  total  number  in  the 
region  decreased  from  41,000  in  1958  to  25 000  in  1965. 
~pecialisation has  brought  larger  deep  sea  fi~hing vessels, 
mcreased  total  catches,  and  major  developments  in  the 
processing  sector.  The  establishement  of  such  key  firms 
~s A/S  Fin_dus  du~ng the  late  fifties  brought  large  scale 
mvestment m  freezmg plants. The region now accounts for 
80  per  cent  of  Norway's  total  production  of fish  fillets. 
With  over-fishing  already  a  problem  in  coastal  waters 
the  region  naturally  views  with  concern  the  implication~ 
of a future fisheries  policy as a result of EEC membership. 
In view of the close relation in Norway between regional 
and national economic policy,  the original programme for 
the  North  ended  in  1961  and  was  merged  with  the  new 
Regio'!al  Development Fund,  benefiting  all  problem  areas 
but  wit~  .the three northern provinces  still enjoying special 
tax  pnvtleges.  Although  both  production  and  income 
remain  somewhat  l.Q_wer  than  in  the  rest  of  the  country, 
there can be no doubt of the North's considerable achieve-
ments  over the  last twenty  years.  Between  1950  and 1966 
the region's  share  of the gross  national product rose  fro~ 
2.1  to  7  per  cent.  Over  the  same  period,  the  region's 
employed  population  grew  by  13  per  cent  with  2.8  per 
cent  for  the  country  as  a  whole.  The  rapid  development 
of the  ~e.gion's hydro-electric  power potential (only  34  per 
cent  ubhsed  by  1965)  has  been  a  decisive  factor  in  the 
growth of industry the gross value of which rose seven-fold 
between  19~0-1966.  The  rural  electrification  programme 
from supplymg only 43  per cent of the population in  1947 
is now virtually complete. 1. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
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Based on data derived from 1.8. Thompson Tourism  ("land  of  the  midnight  sun")  provides  a  new 
ingredient  in  the  growth  of  the  regional  economy  and 
has  benefitted considerably from improved communications 
and  accommodation  provision.  Further  encouragement 
for  the  future  comes  from  the  setting  up  of  an  Inter-
Nordic  Advisory  Commission  in  1968,  to  investigate  the 
possibilities  of joint development projects across  the whole 
of Nordkalotten. In the same year the decision to establish 
a  regional  university  at  Troms0  has  greatly  contributed 
to  this  new  psychological  climate  which  is  breaking  down 
the  centuries-old  isolation  of  North  Norwegian  society. 
Western  Eire 
Poverty has for long appeared endemic to Ireland. Escape 
from  this  despairing  background  meant emigration,  which 
took place on such a massive scale  that today the  country 
is  left  with  barely  half  the  population  maximum  reached 
130  years  ago.  Now  the  most  pressing  regional  problem 
is  the very maintenance of a  viable population in  Western 
Eire,  which has not shared fully  in the economic  recovery 
experienced in eastern parts of the country, particularly of 
course  around  Dublin.  Combining  both  the  problems  of 
geographical  isolation  and  economic  marginality,  this  des-
ignated  "underdeveloped" western  region  comprises  12  out 
of the  26  counties  of the  Republic  (Fig.  3)  but over  one 
third  of the country's  population  and as  such  its  retarded 
development  constitutes  a  considerable  drag  upon  the 
whole Irish economy. 
The marked reduction  in net emigration loss  since  1961 
(16,000  p.a.  during  1961-1966  as  against  40,000  p.a.  be-
tween  1951-1961)  explains  the  welcome  upward  trend  in 
total  population,  but  nevertheless  masks  the  continuation 
of  earlier  problems.  Deteriorating  demographic  structures 
consequent  upon  age/sex  selective  migration  still  threaten 
many communities in the West with stagnation and decay. 
Furthermore,  the  lack  of any  worthwhile  urban  develop-
ment  in  this  region  coupled  with  persistent  decline  in 
population  leaves  local  purchasing  power  at  a  minimal 
level.  The ratio  of urban to  rural population in the West 
is  approximately 1 to 5 in contrast to 1.5  to  1 in the East. 
Already  during  the  last  40  years,  Dublin's  growth  has 
increased its  share of the country's population from  14  per 
cent tot over 25  per cent. 
Agriculture  is  still  the  most  important  single  industry 
in  Ireland,  accounting  with  forestry  and fishing  for  some 
27  per cent  of the  labour  force.  In  parts  of the  western 
region to proportion so  employed remains well over 50 per 
cent.  Relatively  poor soil  resources,  small  and fragmented 
farms  (in  1961  nearly  half  the  farms  in  the  West  were 
under  30  acres),  and  lack  of  co-operative  organisation 
characterise  a  farm  economy  which  remains  largely 
subsistence orientated. The major obstacle to  change arises 
from  the  high  age  structure  of  the  farm  population.  A 
recent sample  survey  of the western  region  showed  nearly 
60  per cent of full-time farmers to be over 50 years of age, 
30  per cent  of whom  with  no  successors.  In order to  en-
courage  movement  off  the  land  and  accelerate  necessary 
rationalisation  of  farm  structures,  the  1965  Land  Act 
provides  a  retirement  scheme  for  old  an  incapacitated 
farmers.  However,  undue  dependence  of  the  western 
economy  on  agriculture  clearly  underscores  the  urgency 
of this problem. Survival of the western region is  dependent 
not only  upon  the development  of a  thriving  agricultural 
industry  but  also  on  the  emergence  of  non-agricultural 
activities  in  sufficient  numbers  to  compensate  for  the 
prospective  decline  in  the agricultural population. 
The  Underdeveloped  Areas Act 1952  marked  a  reversal 
of  the  earlier  post-independence  industrial  policy  of 
isolationism and protection. Specific areas were now favour-
ed  (later  extended  to  the  present  western  region  in  1961) 
by  grants  to  aid  establishment  of new  industry.  With  the 
home  market  exhausted,  particular  encouragement  was 
given  to  industries  orientated  towards  export  and  more 
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significantly  still  to  foreign  participation.  In  recent  years, 
the latter has represented up to  80  per cent of all invest-
ment in newly established manufacturing concerns. 
Against  a  background  where  nearly  half the population 
is  dispersed outside towns  of over 1,500  inhabitants, indus-
trialisation  poses  more  than the usual  problems.  Paradox-
ically in a land with a labour surplus, where unemployment 
remains  high  despite  the  fact  that  one  quarter  of  each 
generation  has  to  emigrate  for  lack  of  employment 
opportunities,  it is  not always  easy to find  one  place with 
sufficient workers for industrial development. Hence the pro-
longed debate over the choice of a spread policy or growth 
centre  policy.  The launching  of the  Small  Industries  Pro-
gramme  in  1969  is  a  measure of the government's faith in 
the modernisation of many existing small industries scattered 
throughout  local  towns  in  the  West.  Even  so,  recently 
commissioned  advisory  reports  have  urged  concentration 
on a number of growth centres (Fig.  3a), a  policy to some 
extent  anticipated  in  the  Mid-West  (Limerick)  planning 
region  by the development  around Shannon  Airport. 
Amongst  the  first  regional  plans  to  be  published,  the 
Mid-West Region  (265,000  population in 1966),  comprising 
the  counties  of Clare,  Limerick  and  the  North  Riding  of 
Tipperary, focuses naturally on the proposed growth triangle 
of  Limerick-Ennis-Shannon.  The  Shannon  Estuary  cuts 
deeply  into the heart of this  sparsely populated peripheral 
region, which at first  sight appears as  a  surprising location 
for  the  country's  third  biggest  concentration  of  industry 
outside  Dublin  and Cork,  and  largely  developed  over  the 
last ten years. Shannon Industrial Estate provides an import-
ant example of industrial  development  based  on  air trans-
portation.  In  the  mid-fifties  Shannon  Airport  was  being 
overflown  by  new  long-haul  trans-Atlantic  jets  and seemed 
threatened by closure.  Modem developments  all stem from 
the Customs-Free Airport Act 1947 which established Shan-
non  as  the  first  customs  free  airport  in  the  world.  The 
Shannon  Free  Airport Development Authority was  created 
in  1957  to  promote  use  of  the  airport  for  warehousing/ 
freight  handling  services,  an  industrial  estate  and  tourism. 
The  first  step  was  the  completion  of  a  new  jet  runway 
in  1960. 
Special grants and incentives were offered to new factories, 
including  exemption  from  corporation  tax  on  all  export 
profits  until  1983.  In  1966,  the  industrial  estate  adjoining 
a  small  new  town employed  nearly 4,000  workers  in  some 
30 firms,  which in that year produced  30  per cent of Eire's 
manufactured exports.  The  wide  variety  of products  natu-
rally have  a  high  value  to  weight  ratio  readily  adaptable 
to air transport. Electronics equipment constitutes the  most 
important single group. With the majority of workers com-
muting in from  the  surrounding region,  industrial develop-
ment at Shannon (and more recently at Ennis and Limerick) 
has  already  contributed  strongly  to  stabilising  population 
trends (Fig.  3b). 
Corsica 
"Miseria" is  how  they  describe  poverty  in  Corsica.  The 
word conveys  an immediate sense  of the profound malaise 
rooted  in  the  recent  history  of  this  island  society.  Seen 
in  the  context  of  the  northern  and  western  periphery  of 
Europe,  the  acute  poverty  still  evident  in  parts  of  the 
Mediterranean  is  scarcely  comparable.  Here  are  to  be 
found  regions  with  the  most  impoverished  housing  con-
ditions,  the highest rates  of infantile mortality and disease, 
and the most archaic economic structures in Europe. 
Corsica's  essential  physical  traits,  its  insularity,  pre-
dominantly mountainous terrain and mediterranean climate, 
provide a  distinctive  geographical  background.  Against  the 
latter,  consideration  of  the  island's  resource  base  is  best 
understood  by  reference  to  a  threefold  regional  division. 
The  discontinuous,  alluvial  littoral  zone  offers  the  best 
potential  for  intensive  agriculture  but  on  the  eastern  side 
of the island,  in particular,  has  been  virtually unexploited until recently. The neglect of Corsica's greatest unused land 
resource relates both to the island's troubled past and to the 
problems of what was a difficult physical environment. Open 
to  attack  from  maritime  marauders  as  well  as  scourged 
by  malaria,  the  coastal  plain  was  abandoned  for  the 
secure  and  healthy  hill-tops  and  mountain  slopes  inland. 
This  intermediate  "coteaux"  region  of  dissected  hill  land 
between  100  and 500  metres still remains  the  most densely 
populated  rural  zone,  but is  now  pervaded  by  dereliction 
and  decay.  The  collapse  of traditional  agriculture  at  the 
beginning  of  the  century  provoked  depopulation,  massive 
land  abandonment  and  the  invasion  of  dense  "maquis''. 
Most  of the  island's  interior,  however,  is  dominated  by  a 
high  crystalline  massif  of forested  and  rugged  mountains 
rising  to  well  over  2,000  metres  and  penetrated  by  deep 
gorges. It is  the rivers  fed  by this  mountainous core which 
now provide an indispensable resource for the development 
of a new agriculture: water to irrigate the coastal plains. 
Agricultural  resources  have  been  irrationally  exploited. 
Obviously  this  must  partly  reflect  the  limited  technical 
abilities  of traditional  agriculturalists  faced  with  problems 
such  as  the  reclamation  of  the  coastal  plain,  involving 
seasonally  both  drainage  and  irrigation.  The  degeneration 
of agriculture,  developed  as  it was  in  the  "coteaux" zone, 
attained  catastrophic  proportions.  The  area  under cultiva-
tion has decreased from some 40 per cent at the end of the 
last century to  3 per cent  today.  During  the  same  period, 
the island lost well  over half its  rural population and now 
depends  for  the  majority  of its  food  supplies  on  imports. 
The  rigid  application  of  inheritance  laws  meant  the  con-
tinued  persistence  of fragmented  structures,  as  a  result  of 
which 80 per cent of holdings in 1963 were under 5 hectares. 
Equally  inevitable  has  been  the  scale  of  demographic 
decline.  Although  censuses  are  notoriously  unreliable  in 
Corsica,  the  total  population  today is  at least  100,000  less 
than  the  maximum  of 280,000  reached  around  1890.  The 
influx of repatriates after 1962 brought a slight improvement 
but  mainly  focused  on  the  few  towns,  with  over  three-
quarters  of  the  island's  communes  still  experiencing 
decline. 
The  Corsican  regional  plan,  published  in  1957,  is  based 
on a  reappraisal  of the  island's  resources.  Corsica  totally 
lacks  industrial resources  and the factors  of insularity  and 
:a  limited  internal  market  have  long  combined  to  retard 
economic  growth.  Against  these  deficiencies  can  be  listed 
the real  potential  of extending the  area  of productive land 
through  irrigation,  a  climate  which  permits  a  wide  crop 
range  and  continuous  thermal  growing  season,  numerous 
sites  for  the  generation  of HEP and  a  wealth  of  tourist 
resources.  Accordingly  two  development  companies  were 
immediately set up to co-ordinate and implement the plan's 
priority objectives affecting the rehabilitation of agriculture, 
clearly  a  long  term  programme,  and  the  expansion  of 
tourism,  already  potentially  the  backbone  of  the  island's 
economy. 
Since  1957,  the  activities  of SOMIVAC (Societe  pour  Ia 
mise en valeur de  Ia  Corse)  have already brought dramatic 
changes  to  the  agrarian  landscape  of  the  eastern  coastal 
plain,  which  includes  a  potentially  cultivable  area  of 
40,000  hectares.  The  immediate  objectives  in  this  region 
following  initial  basic  research  into  agricultural  potential 
were  the  reclamation  of  20,000  hectares  of land  and  the 
construction  of  an  irrigation  network  for  new  farms.  By 
1966,  the  "maquis"  cover  of  three  main  perimeters  had 
been  cleared  and,  together  with  a  fourth  small  perimeter 
on the north-west side of the island, 100 new farms created 
on over 4,000  hectares of reclaimed land (Fig. 4a).  In order 
to make greater progress, SOMIVAC extended its activities 
to include the development under contract of local, decaying 
farms,  many  of which  were  located  close  to existing  peri-
meters.  New  roads  and  buildings,  irrigation  and  drainage 
works  were  undertaken  on  acceptance  of conditions  relat-
ing to the choice of crops and farming methods. 
Such  achievements  have  not  been  without  problems. 
Three-quarters of the new farms so far established are in the 
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hands  of repatriates  from  Algeria,  already  experienced  in 
irrigation  techniques  and  commercial  agriculture  in  North 
Africa. In effect, the high level of investment demanded has 
virtually  excluded  Corsicans  from  the  new  highly  capital-
ised,  plantation  style  farms,  a  situation which  has  aroused 
the  hostility  of local  farmers.  In addition,  the  newcomers 
have  opted  for  widespread  planting  of vines-because  of 
quicker  return-contrary  to  SOMIV  AC'S  selection  of 
citrus fruits as the principal specialisation on irrigated lands. 
Vine  monoculture undoubtedly  entail  risks,  but so  also  to 
an  extent  do  the  uncertain  commercial  outlets  for  citrus 
fruits  and  vegetables  in  competition  with  mainland  pro-
ducers.  The  solution  must  await  the  future  development 
of agricultural processing industries  on the island itself. 
SETCO  (Societe  pour  l'equipenment  touristique  de  la 
Corse)  is  in  the  process  of creating  a  number of holiday 
villages and tourist complexes.  A first  chain of high quality 
hotels has  been completed around Corsica's coast (Fig.  4b) 
hotels has been completed around Corsica's coast (Fig.  4b). 
In  the  two  years  before  1957,  the  annual  number  of 
tourists  to  Corsica  increased  from  67,000  to 110,000.  Ten 
years  later  the  annual  total  had  reached  over  300,000. 
Improved  links  with  the  mainland  by  new  car  ferries 
and  more  frequent  air  services  have  facilitated  this 
rapid expansion. However, the island's internal communica-
tions  network  remains  completely  inadequate  and  presents 
.a  major obstacle to  opening up the interior.  Here the suc-
cess  of projects  like  the  creation  of a  regional  park  and 
the establishment of a  winter sports centre will  depend  on 
progress in providing better road links. Perhaps greater con-
cern for the islands future should be attached to the fact that 
much  development is  in the hands  of outside interests  and 
will  not help capital formation within  Corsica itself.  While 
severe  problems  will  continue  to exist,  at least the decline 
of the  last  hundred years  which  had appeared  irreversible 
has  been halted and a  period  of reconstruction  begun. 
Perspectives 
The  great  restructuring  of  European  society  triggered 
off  by  the  industrial  revolution  conferred  insuperable 
advantages  upon  certain  favoured  regions  which  have  so 
far prevented any major shifts  away from  these established 
centres  of population  and  activity.  The divergent  histories 
of three regions geographically distanced from their national 
growth  areas  have  been  briefly studied.  In each case,  with 
some  variation,  a  trilogy  of  basic  problems  faced  the 
region:  persistent  out-migration  and  depopulation,  related 
in  tum  to  over-dependence  on  a  retarded  agricultural 
economy  and  to  a  low  level  of urban-industrial  develop-
ment. Far from merely accepting the consequences  of such 
regional  distortions,  spontaneous  and planned  efforts  have 
begun  to  a  lesser  or  greater  extent  to  revitalise  these 
peripheral regions. 
Inevitably,  regional  differences  and  opportunities  imply 
varied  solutions,  but  everywhere  the  need  for  improved 
communications  affording  both easier access  to the  region 
and  more  effective  integration  within  it  has  appeared  of 
primary  importance.  In  this  respect,  the  expansion  of 
tourism  as  a  potential lever  of the  economy  of a  hitherto 
remote  region  is,  apart from  the  more  obvious  resources, 
clearly dependent upon efficient transport links. 
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The oil industry in the European 
Community and the United Kingdom 
Oil is  one of the  most vital  requirements of a  modern economy.  Oil  and its derivatives 
have  a  wide  range  of uses  and  applications.  Demands  for  energy  are  met  in  part  by  oil, 
whilst  it  also  maintains  the  transport  system  and  supplies  much  of the  need  for  plastics, 
chemicals and artificial  fibres.  In  1969  about  two  tons  of petroleum  were  consumed  in  the 
Community  and  the  United  Kingdom  for  each  inhabitant.  The  demand  is  not  only  large 
but also it is growing at a rate of about 8 to  10  per cent per annum. 
To  meet this  demand,  a  complex  network  of supply  areas,  transportation,  refining  and 
distribution  has  been  evolved.  The  operation  and maintenance  of these  networks  is  a  large 
undertaking and not surprisingly, is in the hands of some of the largest international companies 
in  the  world.  However,  the  oil  industry  is  not  without  its  problems  and  the  two  gravest 
threats it faces  are,  in  the long  term,  exhaustion of the  world's oil  reserves,  and in  the  short 
term, the pollution and despoilation  of the  environment by  oil products. 
Growth of demand 
The  demand  for  oil  in  the  economies  of  the  Common 
Market countries and the United Kingdom has been conti-
nually  expanding  since  the  war.  The  increase  has  been 
spectacular  at  times,  and  has  consistently  been  greater 
than predicted. Expansion of oil consumption has also been 
even  faster  than  economic  growth.  The  patterns  of  con-
sumption show the ways in which oil has become a  major 
industry, both by winning new markets for oil products and 
by the expansion of existing markets. 
In 1955-i.e. when the European economies had returned 
to  normal,  following  their  war-time  dislocation-,  crude 
oil  consumption  in  the  European  Community  of the  Six 
stood  at  70  million  tons.  The  United  Kingdom,  at  this 
time,  was  consuming  a  further  28  million  tons.  Demand 
grew  steadily  during  the  late  1950s,  at an average  rate of 
between 12 and 15  per cent annually, both in the  Commu-
nity and in Britain. The period between 1960 and 1965  saw 
a  massive upsurge of demand within the Common Market, 
with oil consumption more than doubling to  reach a  level 
of 243.7  million tons in 1965.  Britain, by  contrast,  did not 
experience such a  buoyant demand and consumption grew 
at a  rate  of only  45  per cent  during  the  same  period  to 
reach 66.1  million tons. The later 1960s have seen a further 
sustained  growth  of demand  at around  8  to  10  per cent 
annually.  In 1969  the Community's crude oil  consumption 
was  372.3  million  tons  and  that  of the  United  Kingdom 
93.7  million  tons,  which  was  greater  than  that of the six 
Community countries in 1955. 
Demand for oil is  expected  to  rise  still  further.  Indeed, 
future  problems  are not in finding  markets  for oil  but in 
finding  enough  reserves  to  meet  predicted  demands. 
Although within  the decade  1960-1969  the Common Mar-
ket's  oil  consumption  had risen  by  the  spectacular  figure 
of 210  per cent, more oil is  likely to be used in the next 
decade than in the last ninety years. 
Three  events  have  largely  caused  the  expansion  of oil 
consumption  since  the  war.  First,  the  period  in  general 
has  been one of prosperity and a  high level  of economic 
activity.  In these circumstances, it is  hardly surprising that 
the  demand  for  such  a  basic  requirement  as  oil  has 
increased apace. 
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Secondly,  oil  has  found  a  great  variety  of new  uses  in 
the  economy  in  the  post-war  period.  These  have  focused 
upon oil  as  a  raw material,  rather than the  older uses  as 
a  fuel. Thus the supply of feedstocks  to the petro-chemical 
industry  has  become  an  important function  of oil.  Oil  is 
now  a  raw  material  of  products  as  diverse  as  synthetic 
rubber, artificial fabrics,  plastics  and fertilizers.  Within the 
Community,  petro-chemical  consumption  alone  has  risen 
threefold  between  1958  and  1968.  As  fuel,  oil  has  also 
found  greatly  expanded uses.  Convenience  and cleanliness 
in handling and operation have helped to make its use as a 
domestic  heating  agent  widespread.  Developments  in 
technology  have  permitted  oil  to  replace  coal  in  blast 
furnaces  in pig-iron manufacture. 
Thirdly,  in  its  traditional  field  as  a  fuel,  oil  has  also 
experienced  rapidly  increasing  demand.  The  large  rise  in 
the number of private  cars  has  seen  an enormous  growth 
of  demand  for  petrol,  and  the  expansion  of  commercial 
aviation  has  provided  a  growing  market.  The  decline  of 
railways  as  the  prime  transport  medium  has  seen  an 
increased demand for diesel fuels  for heavy road vehicles. 
On  the  railways  themselves,  oil  has  been  in  demand 
following  the almost total demise of the steam locomotive. 
Much of the growth of demand for oil has come from a 
substitution of oil for coal. This has occurred in a  variety 
of  fields,  but  especially  in  the  production  of  secondary 
sources of energy.  Oil has been replacing coal as the chief 
fuel  in  electricity  power-stations,  both  in  the  Common 
Market  countries  and  in  Britain.  The  reasons  for  the 
success  of oil  in competition  with coal are several.  Oil  is 
relatively  richer  as  a  fuel  (1  ton  of  oil  is  the  thermal 
equivalent of about 1.34  tons of coal). Oil is  cleaner, more 
convenient  and  more  easily  stored.  Above  all,  for  many 
years,  the  price  of oil  in  Europe  fell  relative  to  that  of 
other  fuels,  owing  especially  to  economies  of  scale  in 
transport  (new  large-capacity  pipelines  and  giant  tankers). 
With  coal  becoming  increasingly more costly  to  mine,  oil 
had little trouble in becoming such a  strong competitor. 
The impact of oil's  competitive  edge  is  best seen  in its 
dominating  share of primary  energy  consumption.  Within 
the  Community,  oil  accounted  for  61.7  per  cent  of  the 
primary energy used in 1969,  and coal and solid fuels  for 
only 29  per cent. In the United Kingdom the competitive 
position of oil has been tempered by the imposition of an excise  duty of 1 p. per gallon. This duty has been intended 
to  give  a  degree  of protection to coal. The share of oil in 
the  energy economy, 47  per cent, is  the  lowest in western 
Europe, and coal has  retained a  share  of 48.5  per cent of 
primary energy consumption. 
Recent  substantial  rises  in  crude-oil  costs,  however,  and 
the  relative insecurity  of oil  supplies,  as  the  oil-producing 
countries organised themselves into a producers' association 
(OPEC)  have  turned  attention  to  some  extent  back  to 
coal. 
Oil  consumption 
The  present  pattern  of oil  consumption  is  the  result  of 
two decades of technological advance, in which a variety of 
new uses have been found. Oil is not one single commodity; 
the  refinery  process  produces many oil  derivatives  suitable 
for  marketing.  Although  most  of  the  oil  consumed  is  in 
only  three  forms,  the  sectors  in  which  it  is  finally  used 
are  many,  and  testify  to  the  role  of  oil  at  the  heart 
of a  modern  economy. 
Oil  refining  is  basically  a  process  whereby  crude  oil  is 
split into  a  variety  of liquids and gases,. ranging  fro~ the 
heavier products  such  as  bitumen and pitch to  the lighter 
spirits  such  as  aviation  fuels  and  petroleum  gas.  Crude 
oil is  heated and at different temperatures differing vapours 
are  given  off,  collected  and  then  condensed.  Al:though 
all crude oil will yield this full range of products, ml from 
various  fields  gives  slightly  differing  quantities  of  each 
derivative.  The  maintenance  of  a  balanced  demand  for 
all  of  these  products  has  long  been  a  problem.  At  the 
present time,  less  than  1 per cent of the crude oil input is 
lost or discarded as waste in refining. 
Three types  of  oil  product  account for  86  per  cent  ~f 
refined  petroleum  production.  T~e la~gest of the  !hree  IS 
fuel  oil  which is  used as  a  fuel  m  bmlers for heatmg and 
generating  electricity.  Diesel  oil  and  motor  gasoline  show 
how the supply of fuels  for the internal combustion engine 
is  such a vital function for the industry. Aviation fuels  are 
a  small  part  of  refined  oil  consumption.  N ap.hthas  w~re, 
until  recently,  usually  waste  products  from . ml  refinenes, 
but  the  oil  gasification  process  of  producmg  town-gas, 
using  naphthas  as  a  raw  materia:!,  is  cheaper  than  the 
gasification  of  coal.  In  Britain,  within  a  decade  of  its 
introduction, it accounted for nearly 71  per cent of all  gas 
production.  .  .  . 
Oil  has  come  to  be  the  chief  element  m  the  pnmary 
energy supply of the European Community, and the energy 
sector  is  the  largest  consumer  of  oil  and  products, 
accounting  for  28.1  per  cent  of oil  consumption  in  1970. 
Industry and transport also  each  consume about  th~ same 
amount  of  oil.  Although  not  a  large  user  of  Oil,  the 
petro-chemical  industry  accounts  for  about  ~ per  cent. of 
final  consumption.  The  pattern  of  demand  m  the  Umted 
Kingdom  is  largely  the same  as  in  the  Common  Market. 
The structure 
of the industry 
Two  features  stand  out  about  the  structure  of  the  oil 
industry.  The first  is  the vast size of the companies-some 
of  the  largest  in  the  world-and  the  second  is  the  high 
degree of vertical integration commonly found. The typical 
company  is  active  at  all  levels  of  the  industry  from 
exploration  and  production  through  transportation  and 
refining  to  final  marketing  of petroleum  products.  Within 
this  large-scale  industry,  seven  companies,  commonly 
called the "majors" stand pre-eminent. Together, the majors 
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produce nearly 80  per cent of the non-Communist world's 
crude  oil  and  control  almost  70  per  cent  of the  refinery 
capacity. All are active in western Europe, and all but two 
are  American  based. 
Relative size of US and European oil firms 
Assets:  ($  million  1965) 
Standard Oil  of New Jersey:  (US) 
Texaco:  (US) 
Gulf Oil:  (US) 
Royal  Dutch  Shell:  (Netherlands/UK) 
British  Petroleum  (UK) 
ENI: (Italy) 
Petrofina:  (Belgium) 
Compagnie Fran9aise des Petroles: (France) 
Source:  C.  LAYTON,  Trans-Atlantic  Investment. 
13,073 
5,343 
5,211 
12,107 
3,856 
2,451 
1,030 
764 
The  largest  company  is  Standard  Oil  of  New  Jersey, 
whose  products  are  better  known  by  the  name  of  Esso. 
This  was  the  largest  part  of  Rockefeller's  Standard  Oil 
empire after it was split up to avoid anti-trust legislation in 
the  early years  of the  century.  The other four  American 
companies  each  only  achieve  about  a  half  Esso's  crude 
oil  production,  but  are  roughly  equal  in  size  among 
themselves.  These  are  Texas  Oil  (Texaco),  Gulf  Oil, 
Standard  Oil  of  California  whose  petrol,  Chevron,  is  a 
relative  newcomer  to  Europe,  and  Standard  Oil  of  New 
York (Mobiloil). 
The second  largest  company  is  the  Anglo-Dutch  Royal 
Dutch/Shell group, which is only slightly smaller than Esso. 
Its  ownership  is  in  fact  split  roughly  60:40  between  the 
Dutch  company,  Royal  Dutch,  and  the  British  company, 
Shell  Transport  and  Trading.  The  Dutch  company  has 
substantial  American  (30  per  cent),  French  (16  per  cent) 
and  Swiss  (17  per  cent)  equity  holdings  in  it  as  well  as 
Dutch  (30  per cent).  In the  United  Kingdom,  it has  had 
since  1932  a  working  and marketing  union with  the third 
largest  company,  BP.  However  the  association  is  being 
gradually severed  and both  BP  and Shell  will  compete  in 
the  British market as  they  already  do  throughout the rest 
of the world.  BP  is  unique among the majors in having  a 
sizeable  proportion  of  government  capital;  the  British 
government  has  had  a  shareholding  since  1913.  The 
present holding is 49 per cent, but the company's operations 
are free  from  direct  state intervention. 
A  challenge  to  the  operations  of the majors  in Europe 
has come from  two  quarters. First, the state oil companies 
of  France  and  Italy  have  provided  strong  opposition.  In 
France  the  Compagnie  Franfaise  des  Petroles  (CFP)  has 
secured  a  good  share  of the  market,  and its  Total petrol 
is  also  to  be  found  in  other countries.  Under  the earlier 
enterprising  leadership  of Enrico  Mattei,  the  Italian  Ente 
Nazionale  ldrocarburi  (EN!)  made  its  brand  name  of 
Agip  something of a  European legend.  Second, spurred on 
by American import restrictions.  on foreign  crud~ oil,  the 
smaller  United  States  compames  have  been  vigorously 
invading  the  European  market.  Companies  such  as 
Continental  (Conco  and  Jet),  faced  with  considerable 
non-American  sources  of  crude  oil,  have  been  forced  to 
fight  fiercely  with  cut-price  tactics  for  alternative  outlets, 
especially in Europe. 
The supply of oil 
The provision of oil to meet the large demand in western 
Europe is  only  a  part of the  world  oil  industry.  Western 
Europe is,  however,  a  special case, as it possesses  virtually 
no oil resources of its own. Oil is consequently an important 
element in the import trade of Western European countries: 
over 96  per cent of total supplies are imported. Transport MAIN SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF OIL AND  NATURAL GAS IN THE E.E.C.  AND  U.K.  v  ~ 
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for natural gas of these quantities of oil is a considerable problem. Refining 
of crude  oil  and distribution  to  consumers  completes  the 
chain of supply. 
Sources of oil 
Only 3. 7 per cent of the Community's oil needs  are met 
from  indigenous  sources  and  only  a  miniscule  amount of 
the  United  Kingdom's.  Within  the  Community,  West 
Germany is  the major oil  producer,  with  a  production  of 
7.9  million  tons  in  1969.  France,  the  Netherlands  and 
Italy together supplied a  further 6 million  tons. 
In  the  mid-1960s,  exploration  for  oil  and  natural  gas 
began in the North Sea  basin.  Although the discoveries of 
natural  gas  have  been  to  date  the  more  impressive, 
considerable  quantities  of oil  have  been  discovered.  Early 
in  1970  a  major  find  of  oil  was  made  just  inside  the 
Gulf is  reflected  in  the  large  quantities  of oil  bought  by 
Britain  from  Kuwait  in  particular. 
North  Africa  is  a  more  recent  oil-producing  area.  Part 
of its  importance to Europe lies  in the fact that it is  some 
2,000  miles  closer  than  most  of  the  Middle  East 
sources  and  transport  costs  are  proportionally  reduced. 
Former  colonial  ties  account  for  the  28.6  per cent  share 
of  French  imports  coming  from  Algeria.  Exploitation  of 
oil-fields  in  Libya  early  in  the  1960s,  has  seen  Europe 
develop  a  marked  dependence  on  this  source.  France, 
with  nearly  one  fifth  of its  imports  coming  from  Libya, 
is  the least  dependent on this  oil,  but West Germany has 
come to rely on over 45  per cent of its  imports from this 
single  source. 
Limited  amounts  of oil are  drawn  from  Latin America, 
because of traditional American dominance in this area and 
higher  transport  costs.  West  Africa,  and  in  particular 
Nigeria,  has  begun  to  supply  more  oil  to  Europe.  The 
small  quantity  of oil,  some  14.6  million  tons,  supplied  to 
the  Six  by  the  Soviet  Union  is  of  political  rather  than 
Sources of imported oil in  the  European  Community and the  UK 
(percentage  of total oil  imports) 
Source  ~um I  France  Wdt  I  Italy  Nether- EEC  UK  Germany  lands 
Venezuela  9.0  2.7  4.3  2.4  1.8  3.4  6.1 
USSR  2.1  3.9  9.1  4.1 
Algeria  5.9  28.6  9.5  1.9  0.2  4.1 
Libya  20.3  17.3  45.2  27.9  23.2  28.4  23.2 
West Africa  2.5  3.5  2.0  7.9  2.7  5.9 
Kuwait  13.3  9.1  3.3  17.2  20.3  11.9  28.3 
Saudi Arabia  17.2  5.4  13.4  13.4  12.3  11.6  14.9 
Iran  22.4  4.3  6.6  3.3  15.0  7.5  8.5 
Iraq  5.7  17.2  2.6  18.0  11.9  12.1  4.1 
Qatar  1.9  2.2  0.4  2.6  1.5  1.7  3.4 
Other M. East  1.5  6.8  7.2  4.3  4.7  5.4  3.9 
Others  0.2  0.8  1.4  1.4  0.7  0.5 
OPEC members  82.7  87.0  85.3  86.6  86.1  87.0  89.6 
Source:  Oil  Statistics  OECD,  1969,  Paris. 
N.B.  Percentage  do  not  total  to  100  because  of  rounding. 
Norwegian  sector  of  the  North  Sea.  This  field,  Ekofisk, 
is  estimated  to  hold  reserves  of  140  million  tons,  which 
makes  it one  the  largest  single  oil  deposits  in  the  world. 
Transport of this crude oil  to markets remains a  problem, 
with  the  technological  difficulties  of  deep-water  pipelines 
adding  to  those  of  cost.  However,  it  is  estimated  that 
North  Sea  oil  will  be  competitive  with  oil  from  other 
sources. Events  during the winter of 1970-1971  have shown 
how precarious  and potentially costly  oil from the  Middle 
East may become in future.  The value of the North Sea as 
an  alternative  supply  of  oil  is  at  present  unfortunately 
limited,  and will  probably not be  able to meet more than 
13  per cent of Britain's demand in the mid-1970s. 
In  1969  the  European  Community  imported  some  358 
million tons of crude oil, and the United Kingdom a further 
91.2  million  tons.  Although  there  are  some  variations 
between individual members of the Community and Britain, 
the general pattern of oil imports is  the same. The bulk of 
the  imported  oil  comes  from  the  Middle  East and North 
Africa. The complete picture is seen in the following table: 
The  Middle  East  supplied  almost  exactly  half  of  the 
Community's  oil  and  some  63  per  cent  of  that imported 
by the United Kingdom. Within the Community, the major 
Middle Eastern producers were of roughly equal importance 
as suppliers, but the former British presence in the Persian 
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economic  interest.  Most  of  this  oil  is  directed  to  West 
Germany and Italy. 
The situation in which Europe has little oil  but a  large 
demand, and the oil-producing states themselves  have little 
demand, inevitably has led to a conflict of interests. Europe, 
not unnaturally,  has  sought cheap  sources  of oil,  whereas 
countries such as  Kuwait and Libya rely almost totally on 
oil  as  a  source  of revenue.  During  the  1950s,  a  string  of 
new  oil  discoveries  undermined  the  potential  bargaining 
position of individual oil-producing states in  their negotia-
tions  with  the  oil  companies.  In 1960  the  Organisation  of 
Petroleum  Exporting Countries  (OPEC)  was  formed to  try 
to  redress  the balance. The present members of OPEC are 
Algeria,  Abu Dhabi, Indonesia,  Iran,  Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. 
Not  until  a  new  revolutionary  regime  in  Libya,  in 
tough  negotiations  with  the  oil  companies,  succeeded  in 
winning  a  further  share  of  30  cents  per  barrel  of  oil 
produced,  did  OPEC  make  much  headway.  A  world  fuel 
shortage  in  1970-1971,  prevailing  high  costs  of  shipping, 
and the closure of the Syria-Persian Gulf pipeline combined 
to  weaken the position  of the oil companies.  In February 
1971,  flushed  by  the  Libyan  success,  the  Persian  Gulf 
members  of  OPEC  won  from  the  oil  companies  an 
increased level  of taxation and a further share of 25  cents per  barrel  in  the  revenues  from  oil  production.  Further 
demands  have  been  made,  and the  power that the  OPEC 
countries have  in their  command of 80  per cent or so  of 
the  world's  oil  production,  has  been  finally  turned  to 
financial  advantage.  The impact  of such  demands  may  be 
seen in that an increase of 25  cents per barrel adds about 
£75  million to  the cost of Britain's oil. 
Transportation 
Transportation  of  oil  is  of  great  importance,  although 
only composing  about 9  per cent of the  total cost  to  the 
consumer. Through a variety of developments, the costs of 
oil  transportation have fallen  relative to  other costs.  First, 
the  greater  use  of pipelines  has  lowered  the  costs  of oil 
transport,  and  secondly,  both  in  pipelines  and  in  ocean-
going tankers, economies of scale have been achieved. 
Pipelines  have been  developed  to bring  oil from interior 
oil-fields  to  the  coast  for  shipment.  A  more  recent 
development  has  been  the  use  of pipelines  to  bring crude 
oil  to  refineries  considerable  distances  away  from  the 
European coast-line. Although more expensive than tankers, 
pipelines  do  offer  marked  savings  in  cost  over  other 
transport media, and it is  estimated that they are ten times 
cheaper than  rail  transport. 
The  larger  pipelines  become,  the  cheaper  they  are  to 
operate,  provided the pipe is full  to capacity. The cost of 
transmitting  oil  through  a  15  em  diameter  pipeline,  for 
instance, is  twice that of using  20  em  pipe and four times 
that of a  30  em pipe. Similarly, economies of scale can be 
reaped  by  increasing  the  size  of oil  tankers.  In  1970  the 
costs  of  transporting  oil  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the 
United Kingdom  can  be  gauged  from  the following  table, 
where  minimum  charter rates  of tankers  of different  sizes 
are set out. 
Charter rates for tankers on the Persian  Gulf-UK run.  1970 
Size of vessel 
50,000  tons 
90,000  tons 
170,000  tons 
250,000  tons 
Cost per ton of oil 
$4.91 
$3.43 
$2.54 
$2.26 
Source:  Financial Times,  4  November  1970. 
The prevailing size of tankers has risen. Such economies 
that  the super-tankers  can  make have  almost nullified  the 
effects  of  the  closure  of  the  Suez  Canal  since  1967.  In 
1960  the  average  size  of an oil  tanker was  around 50,000 
tons,  but  by  1969,  the  average  size  of  new  tankers  was 
well in excess  of 120,000  tons. 
Refineries 
The post-war period has  seen  two  major changes  in  the 
location  of oil  refineries.  At the end  of the  war much  of 
the world's refining capacity lay on or close to the oil-fields. 
Since  then  a  combination  of  political,  strategic  and 
economic factors  has caused  a  large expansion of refinery 
capacity in Europe. The second major change has followed 
in the  1960s  within  the European market.  There has  been 
a  move  towards  inland locations  for refineries,  still  closer 
to  market centres. 
Government incentives  spurred  the  building  of Europe's 
first  post-war refineries,  but econom\c factors  were  already 
making  such  market  locations  attractive.  Continued 
expansion  of  demand  for  a  wide  range  of  oil  products 
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followed  an immediate fuel  shortage. Post-war exploration 
proved  oil-fields  in  a  number  of new  areas,  but most  of 
the  new  refinery  capacity  was  located  in  Europe.  This 
enabled  the  supply  of  crude  oil  to  the  refineries  to  be 
switched  from  one  source  to  another  without  lengthy 
cross-hauls  of oil from  one field  to a  refinery on another. 
The increasing economies of scale in tanker operation also 
provided  a  major stimulus  to  European  refinery  construc-
tion.  Crude  oil  could  be  more  cheaply  transported  in 
larger  tankers  but  the  same  volume  of  oil  when  refined 
would need several tankers, each of smaller size,  to convey 
the  various  products  separately. 
To  these  powerful  economic  arguments  were  added 
strategic and political ones.  Nationalisation of the Abadan 
refinery  in  Iran in  1952  showed  how precarious  assets  in 
producing  nations  could  be.  Events  following  the  Suez 
crisis  of  1956  and  the  Six-Day  War  of  1967  have  also 
emphasised  the  vulnerability  of oil  supplies  to  disruption.. 
To  safeguard  against  the  instability  which  characterises 
some  of the  producing  countries,  the  oil  companies  have 
tended to favour market locations for refineries. 
The  sites  of  the  earliest  post-war  refineries,  such  as 
Fawley  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Marseille  in France, 
were  coastal  in  location.  The  increasing  size  of  tankers 
rapidly  reduced  the number of potential  refinery  sites  and 
caused problems at existing centres. In the United Kingdom, 
Milford  Haven  was  chosen  as  the  site  for three  refineries 
because of its deep water, whilst it also served as a terminal 
for  the  existing  refinery  at Llandarcy  (Swansea)  to  which 
it was  linked by pipeline.  Southampton Water was  dredged 
to  give  Fawley  deeper  water facilities,  and  Fos has  been 
developed  as  a  deep-water  terminal  for  Marseille.  Rotter-
dam's Europort has been built specifically to accommodate 
super-tankers.  Such  has  now  become  the  size  of tankers, 
that  the  deep  water  of  Bantry  Bay  in  S.W.  Ireland,  has 
been used as a trans-shipment point for vessels  upwards of 
200,000  tons  to  off-load  crude oil into smaller tankers for 
distribution to  existing  refineries. 
Economies  of  scale  in  the  use  of  pipelines  for  the 
movement  of crude  oil,  have  also  influenced  the  location 
of refineries.  Within Europe the use  of crude oil pipelines 
has enabled refineries  to  be set up  at inland markets, e.g. 
Ingolstadt  in  southern  Germany.  It is  linked  to  terminals 
both  at  Genoa  and  at  Trieste  by  pipelines,  and  can 
currently  receive  up  to  21  million  tons  of crude  oil  per 
year. 
In  1969  the  European  Community,  with  a  capacity  of 
481.8  million tons  and the United Kingdom with a  further 
109.3  million  tons  had just under a  quarter of the world's 
refinery  capacity.  The largest share within  the Community 
was  that  of  Italy,  with  164.4  million  tons,  whilst  both 
West  Germany  and  France  weye  roughly  equal  with 
Britain.  The distribution of the major refinery  centres  and 
crude oil pipelines is  seen  on the map.  .  . 
Distribution of refined petroleum products IS  still largely 
by  road  and  rail  tanker.  However,  the  good  network  of 
canals in the Community permits much oil to be moved by 
barge. Britain, being an island, has a large proportion of its 
oil distributed by small coastal tanker to depots, and thence 
by road and rail.  Oil-product pipelines  are becoming more 
numerous  but need a large demand to be truly competitive. 
Thus  petro-chemical  works,  such  as  Sevemside in Britain, 
and airports are sometimes  linked to  refineries  by product 
pipelines. 
Note:  Throughout,  oil  tonnages  quoted  have  been  in 
metric  and not English  tons. 
Further reading  : 
P. R.  ODELL,  Oil and World Power, (London,  1970). 
G.  MANNERS,  The  Geography  of Energy,  (London,  1971). 
B.  TAOENDHAT,  Oil,  the  Biggest  Business,  (London,  1968). European  Studies,  13,  1972 
The electoral systems of 
the countries of the 
European Community and Britain 
All the present member countries of the  European  Community are  governed  by  systems 
of parliamentary democracy based on regular elections in which each individual citizen has the 
right  to  take  part.  Each  country,  however,  has  its  own  electoral  system-and all  of them 
differ,  not only  from  each  other,  but also from  the system in  use  in  Britain. Each system has 
its own particular advantages and disadvantages:  the aim of this article is  briefly  to  review  the 
major characteristics of each of these systems. 
United  Kingdom 
The  British  are  not  used  to  discussing  their  electoral 
system. It is  so much an accepted part of political life that 
few  people seem  aware of the results it can produce under 
some circumstances. It leads to an over~representation of the 
large  parties  at  the  expense  of  the  small  ones,  and  it is 
unquestionably  unfair  on  the  Liberals,  the  Scottish  and 
Welsh  Nationalists, and the Communists.  But while  nearly 
everyone agrees that the system is  unfair, there is  a  strong 
resistance  to  any change for fear  that if it is  made easier 
for small parties to flourish,  the stability of government in 
Britain  might  be  endangered.  Yet  this  is  not  necessarily 
true.  While  it  would  not  be  correct  to  say  that  there  is 
no  connection between stability and the number of parties 
that exist in a  country, there is  certainly no necessary con-
nection.  Several  multi-party  political  systems  have  enjoyed 
great stability in  the last  thirty years,  for  example  all  the 
Scandinavian  countries,  the  Netherlands,  etc.  The  key  to 
stability  in  a  country  is  not  the  number  of  parties, 
but the nature of the divisions  in  society.  One has  to  ask 
whether  the  difference  of  opinion  between  the  principal 
groups  in the  country  are  as  deep  and bitter  as  they  are, 
say, in Belgium, or whether there is  basic  agreement about 
the  important  things  as  in  Britain?  In  Britain  there  may 
seem to be great differences  between  the  Conservative and 
Labour Parties, but if lists are drawn up of all the important 
things  on  which  the  two  parties  agree  and  of  those  on 
which  they  are  in  fundamental  disagreement,  the  second 
list will  be much shorter. If one  considers  their behaviour 
in  office,  the  differences  are  smaller  still.  The result of all 
this is that while a particular election result may drastically 
change the lives  of a few,  this will not be the case for most 
people. 
What are  the  undemocratic  consequences  of the  British 
electoral  system  which  are  so  easily  shrugged  off?  What 
are the advantages which many feel  make up for them? 
In the first  place we  elect our members in single-member 
constituencies  by  what is  usually called the "First Past the 
Post" system.  The candidate who receives the largest single 
total of the  votes  is  declared  elected  even  if the votes  of 
his  opponents,  when  added  together  come  to  more  than 
he,  the  leading  candidate,  has  received.  The result  in 
C~eadle  at  the  last  election  admirably  illustrates  this 
pomt: 
T. Normanton (Conservative) 
Dr.  M.  P.  Winstanley  (Liberal) 
R.  Stott (Labour) 
Conservative majority 
39,728 
37,974 
8,062 
1,754 
Mr.  Normanton won  the  seat  even  though  he  received 
only  46.3  per  cent  of  the  votes  cast.  His  "majority"  of 
1,754  only  represents  his  lead  over  the  Liberal  candidate. 
If we  make the assumption that most Labour voters would 
rather  be represented  by a  Liberal  than  a  Conservative,  it 
could be  argued that the electoral system has thwarted the 
wishes  of the majority  of voters  in this  constituency.  Sup-
porters  of  the  system  reply  that  what  the  Labour  voters 
have  lost  on  the  swings  in  Cheadle  they  have  gained  on 
the  roundabouts in,  for  example,  Cardiganshire where  the 
result was  a  victory for them on a much smaller minority 
vote  (33.4  per cent).  All  six  Liberal  M.P.'s  in the  present 
Parliament  won  their  seats  on  minoritv  votes,  but  these 
six "roundabouts" come nowhere near to making up for the 
Liberal  losses  on the  swings.  While  it is  not  a  complete 
lottery,  a  considerable  element  of  chance  shows  in  the 
results over the country as  a whole.  Only twice this century 
(in  1900  and  1931)  has  the party forming the Government 
had  the  backing  of  over  50  per  cent  of  the  electorate.! 
Indeed  in  1951,  the  Conservatives  won  the  election  with 
both  fewer  votes  and  a  smaller  percentage  share  than 
Labour: 
Conservatives and 
Associates 
Labour and Cooperative Party 
13,724,418  (48.04  per cent) 
13,948,385  (48.73  per cent) 
Furthermore, the Labour lost office  even though its vote 
had increased  on the  1950  election  both in numerical  and 
percentage terms. 
It is  difficult  to  see  in what sense  a  system which allows 
this  kind  of result  can  be  said  to  be  democratic,  but in 
fairness  it  should  be  said  that  the  party  winning  most 
seats  nearly always  has more votes than the next strongest 
party. 
Notwithstanding all these shortcomings, the factor which 
convinces most people that the system should be maintained 
is  that while  it is  difficult  for  new  parties  to  get  in,  it is 
not difficult to get the sitting Government out. A compara-
1  In  1935,  the  supporters  of  the  National  Government  obtained 
53.7  per  cent  of  the  vote.  They  were  however,  strictly  speaking,  a 
coalition. tively  small  swing  of votes  against  one  party  has  such  an 
exaggerated  effect  on  the  number  of  seats  that  when  a 
Government is  in  office,  it is  continually  aware  of a  real 
threat  from  t'1e  voters.  This  gives  the  electorate  some 
guarantee that British Governments will  not go  against the 
wis :es of t :e electorate too much and for too long. 
None of the member states of the European Community 
has  so  far  adopted  an  electoral  system  similar  to  that of 
Britain.  The  divisions  of  opinion  in  these  countries  are 
so  great that the  fruits  of office  have  to  be  shared more 
widely  than  in  Britain.  Germany's  Christian  Democrats 
would  have  liked  to  introduce  such  a  system,  but never 
had a Parliamentary majority big enough to push it through. 
France  has  been  the  country  that  has  come  nearest  in 
recent  years  to polarising  political  forces  into  government 
and  opposition  on  the British  model  and this  was  a  most 
important  cause  of  the  revolt  of  1968.  But  even  the 
French, most of whom have  been  concerned since  1958  to 
bring about a polarisation of political forces have not gone 
as  far as the British electoral system. 
France 
In  France,  for  elections  both to  the  National  Assembly 
and  to  the  Presidency,  a  system  known  as  the  Second 
Ballot is used. On polling day voters go to the polling booth 
and vote for 6e canditate of their choice in single-member 
constituencies exactly as they do in  Britain. However, when 
the count takes place at the end of the day, the election is 
only  finished,  if  the  leading  candidate  has  secured  an 
absolute  majority  of the  votes  cast (i.e.  more than all  his 
opponents  put  toget'-:er).  If he  has  not,  then  a  second 
election takes place a week later (two weeks in a Presidential 
election) in which the winner only needs a relative majority 
to win.  In eJections for the National Assembly, a complicat-
ed series of bargains takes  place between the parties about 
who  is  going  to  withdraw  in  whic'1  constituency  in return 
for  recipror.al  favours  elsewhere.  Only  candidates  polling 
le~s  than  10  per  cent  of  the  vote  are  actually  required 
by  law  to  drop  out  at  6e  second  ballot,  but  usually 
enough withdrawals  do  take  place for political reasons  for 
the  issue  to  be  greatly  simplified  at  the  second  ballot.  In 
a  Presidential  election  the  law  requires  6at there  shall 
onJy  be  two  names  on  the  ballot  paper  at  the  Second 
Ballot-the two  leading candidates on  the first  round have 
the right to remain on if t ,ey wish.  In the election at which 
Georges  Pompidou  became  President  the  figures  in  both 
baiiots appear on insert 1 (a). 
It can  be  seen  from  these  figures  that  the  Communist 
candidate  Jacques  Duclos,  narrowly  failed  to  scrape  into 
second place on the first ballot. Had he done so, the second 
ballot would have been a straight run-off between the Gaul-
lists  and  the  Communists.  While  the  second-ballot  system 
mitigates  the  worst  effects  of the  British  system  on  small 
parties,  it  nevertheless  has  anomalies  of  its  own.  For 
example, while  Monsieur Pompidou won  very comfortably 
on  the  second  ballot,  his  winning  vote  represented  only 
37.5  per  cent  of  all  the  registered  voters.  The  system 
also  provides  no  guarantee that there will  be  a  close con-
nection  between  the  votes  cast  for  a  party  and  the  seats 
won in the National Assembly. 
West Germany 
There  have  been  two  strong  influences  operating  in 
Germany  during  the  twentieth  century  in  relation  to  the 
electoral  system.  For much  of this  century  Germany  had 
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a  deeply  divided society and accordingly followed  the gen-
eral Continental tradition of proportional representation in 
her  electoral  system.  During  the  period  of  the  Weimar 
Republic  (i.e.  between  the  end  of  World  War  I  and 
Hitler's  accession  to  power  in  1933),  the  electoral  system 
permitted a large number of splinter parties. They were able 
to  combine  for  various  negative  purposes  to  obstruct  or 
dismiss  a  government, but were unable to provide together 
a  positive alternative. The post-war Constitution (called  the 
Basic  Law)  shows  all  the  signs  of these  pre-war  lessons 
having  been  learnt,  both by  the  Germans  themselves  and 
by  the  allies  who  influenced  the  countries'  post-war 
development. 
The electoral system which has  emerged is  an ingenious 
compromise  known  as  the  "Double Vote".  It secures  the 
best  of both worlds  in  preserving  a  form  of proportional 
representation (PR)  in accordance with the country's tradi-
tion, while obviating some of the disadvantages of PR. The 
system  begins  straightforwardly  with  the  country  being 
divided  into  248  single-member  constituencies  of  roughly 
equal size.  In addition there are  11  constituencies in Berlin, 
which are not in the full sense part of the Federal Republic. 
The  voter  goes  along  to  the  polling  booth  where  he  is 
allowed  to  cast  two  votes.  The first  vote  he  casts  for the 
candidate  of his  choice,  as  in  Britain,  and  at the  end  of 
the  day the  winning  candidate  in  each  constituency  needs 
only  a  relative  majority.  This  situation  discourages  the 
German voter, like  his  British counterpart from  "wasting" 
his  vote on a  small  party and encourages  people  to  make 
a  choice,  perhaps reluctantly, between  the  big  parties.  But 
the  voter  also  has  a  second  vote,  which  he  casts  for  a 
party list  (not necessarily  for the same party to which the 
first  individual  candidate  belonged).  Candidates  on  the 
party  list  are  chosen  by  the  party  organisations  in  the 
Lander  (provinces)  and  not  nationally.  They  can  be  on 
the list while also contesting an individual seat, but, if they 
win  the  latter,  their  names  are  removed  from  the  party 
list.  The main  purpose  of the  party list  is  to assist  those 
parties whose vote is  too evenly spread to be successful in 
single-member  districts,  but  it  also  serves  to  correct  the 
imbalance  between  votes  and  seats  which  single-member 
districts  usually produce.  Over  the  whole  country,  another 
248  seats  (plus  another  eleven  in  Berlin)  are  now  shared 
out on a proportional basis to the parties. If by any chance 
a  party  has  done  so  well  in  the individual  constituencies 
and so  badly  on the  party list  vote  that it has  won more 
seats  for  its  overall  share  than  the  vote  would  justify,  it 
nevertheless  keeps  these  seats  and  if  necessary  the  total 
number of seats  is  increased.  Nobody who wins  a  seat by 
direct election in a  single-member  district can be made to 
give it up. 
To qualify for any share of the second batch of 248 seats 
to be distributed, a  party must either have won three seats 
outright in constituencies somewhere in the Federal Repub-
lic  or must  have  polled  at  least  5  per  cent  of  the  vote, 
again in the whole  Federal Republic. 
The  total  votes  cast  for  each  party  in  each  Land  are 
now  added  up;  parties  can  and usually  do  combine  their 
lists  for  all  the  Lander.  Seats  are  next  distributed  to  the 
parties in proportion to the votes they have received by the 
D'Hondt method, and a  provisional total for each Land is 
calculated.  Before  the final  figure  is  reached, however,  the 
number of seats won by each party by direct election in the 
constituencies is first subtracted from a  party's total entitle-
ment.  The  result  of  this  subtraction  tells  a  party  how 
many seats it can fill from its party list. 
Following the procedure just described, the last Bundestag 
election in 1969  produced, in an 86.8  per cent pool (Berlin 
seats  not included),  the results  in  figure  1(b). 
It now remains to explain the mechanism of the D'Hondt 
method which is followed in allocating the second 248 seats. 
As  the  system  is  named  after  its  Belgian  founder  and  is 
now used in Belgium itself we can best explain it by moving 
;on to that country. (a)  France 
First  Ballot  - June  I,  1969 
Registered voters 
Abstentions 
Went to the polls 
Blank and spoiled  ballots 
Valid votes cast 
Georges Pompidou 
Alain Poher 
Jacques Duclos 
Gaston Deferre 
Michel Rocard 
Louis Ducatel 
Alain Krivine 
29,512,878 
6,614,209 
22,898,669 
293,204 
22,605,465 
Votes 
10,050,804 
5,268,414 
4,811,037 
1,133,241 
816,410 
286,481 
239,078 
Percentage 
44.46 
23.31 
21.28 
5.01 
3.61 
1.27 
1.06 
Second Ballot- June 15, 1969 
Registered voters 
Abstentions 
Went to the polls 
Blank and spoiled ballots 
Valid votes cast 
Georges Pompidou 
Alain Poher 
(b)  Germany 
Party 
29,488,640 
9,181,627 
20,307,013 
1,303,917 
19,003,096 
Votes  Percentage 
11,060,181 
7,942,915 
58.20 
41.79 
Votes  I  Percentage I  Seats 
CDU/CSU 
SPD 
15,203,457  46.1  242 
FDP 
NPD 
Others 
14,074,455  42.7  224 
1,904,387  5.8  30 
1,422,105  4.3 
1.1 
(c)  Belgium 
PSC (Catholic Party) 
PSB  (Socialists) 
PLP (Liberals) 
Communists 
Volksunie (Flemish Party) 
FDF-RW (Walloon Alliance) 
Votes 
Received 
Per cent 
31.74 
27.99 
20.88 
3.30 
9.79 
5.90 
(d) The Netherlands 
General Election of 1967 
Party  Votes 
Catholic  1,822,904 
Labour  1,620,112 
Liberal  738,202 
Anti-Revolutionary  681,060 
Christian Historical  560,032 
Farmers  327,953 
Democrats '66  307,810 
Communist  248,422 
Pacifist Socialist  197,206 
Calvinist Political Party  138,069 
Calvinist Political Union  59,156 
Twelve Others  177,207 
Total  6,878,133 
Seats 
Won 
Per cent 
32.53 
27.83 
22.16 
2.35 
9.43 
5.66 
Percentage 
26.51 
23.55 
10.73 
9.93 
8.14 
4.77 
4.47 
3.61 
2.87 
2.01 
0.86 
2.55 
100.00 Belgium 
In  Belgium  the  system  is  designed  to  ensure  that  the 
seats  won  by a  party in Parliament accurately  correspond 
to the votes cast for that party in the country. This accuracy 
is  not  complete  b~cause the  sharing-out  of  seats  is  done 
at the level of each of the nine provinces and not at national 
level.  Accordingly,  a  minor  party  with  voters  scattered 
throughout the country may be at a disadvantage. However, 
this distortion of proportionality caused by the existence of 
electoral  boundaries  is  really  very  slight,  as  can  be  seen 
from the results  of the election to the House of Represent-
atives in 1968:  2  (Fig.  1 (c)). 
The arrondissement is  the territorial basis of the electoral 
system  and members of the House  of Representatives  are 
elected  in  multi-member  constituencies.  Each  of  these 
arrondissements  receive  lists  of  candidates  from  the  dif-
ferent  parties  and  each  list  contains  the  same  number of 
List  1 
Electoral returns  54,000 
To be divided by:  1  54,000  1st 
2  27,000  3rd 
3  18,000  6th 
4  13,500  7th 
5  10,800  9th 
6  9,000 
The last  (i.e.  the  11th)  quotient,  is  the electoral  divisor 
and  can  be  used  to  check  whether  the  seats  have  been 
correctly  awarded.  Each list  receives  as  many  seats  as  its 
electoral return contains the electoral divisor. 
The Netherlands 
The marginal distortion of proportionality between votes 
and seats that we have noted in Belgium does not occur in 
the  Netherlands.  For  elections  to  their  Second  Chamber 
the Dutch dispense with boundaries altogether and treat the 
whole country as one constituency. This results in the purest 
form  of  proportional  representation  which  is  conceivable 
in practice. The voter goes to the polling booth and votes 
for  a  list.  These  lists  have  been  submitted  in  any  or all 
of  18  electoral  centres.  Parties  wishing  to  maximise  their 
chances  of  winning  the  most  seats  hand  in  lists  in  all 
18  centres  and  formally  declare  that  these  lists  are  in 
alliance. Small parties that are known in one locality only 
need to enter a list in their nearest centre. But whichever of 
these two latter procedures is  followed, it does not alter the 
fact  that for the purposes of the count the whole country 
is  treated as one constituency and all the 150  members of 
the  Second  Chamber  represent  it.  As  in  Belgium,  voters 
are permitted to change one name in the order of the list 
presented  to  them,  but  in  practice  most  voters  do  not 
,  avail themselves of this right. 
When the poll closes,  the procedure  for the count is  as 
follows:  the  total  number  of votes  cast  for  all  parties  is 
divided by the number of seats to be filled  (i.e.  150).  (This 
is known as the Hare Method.) In the General Election of 
2  For a  breakdown of figures  at provincial level  see Robert SENELLE, 
The  Political,  Economic  and  Social  Structures  of  Belgium.  (Memo 
from  Belgium  Nos.  122-123-124  available  from  the  Belgian  Embassy, 
London, p.  49.) 
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names on it as  there are seats to be filled  in the arrondis-
sement.  The parties  are  allowed  to  ally  their  lists  in  one 
arrondissement with those in another in the same province 
so  as  to  use  at  provincial  level  the  remaining  votes  not 
used at arrondissement level. This all sounds very complicat-
ed  so  let  us  confine  ourselves  to an  explanation  of how 
the  D'Hondt  method  would  work  in  its  straightforward 
form  in  a  constituency  which  was  due  to  return 
11  members
3
• 
In this  case  the  voter has  a  choice  of four lists.  If he 
agrees with the order in which the names have been placed 
on the  list  by the parties  he  records this  fact in  a  box at 
the head of the list. If not he can express a  preference for 
one candidate, but in practice most voters  do  not do  this. 
When  the  poll  closes  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  count 
arranges the totals cast for each party in order of size.  In 
proceeding now to allocate the  11  seats available, the totals 
for each list are successively divided by 1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  etc. 
When this formula is applied, the seats are awarded to the 
parties as the table below demonstrates: 
List 2  List 3  List 4 
40,000  21,000  9,800 
40,000 2nd  21,000 4th  9,800 
20,000  5t'1  10,500  lOth  4,900 
13,333  8th  7,000  3,266 
10,000  11th  5,250  2,950 
8,000  4,200  1,960 
1967  this  total  was  6,878,133.  When  this  figure  is  divided 
by 150  it produces an electoral  "quotient" of 45,854.  This 
quotient is  then divided  into  the  total  votes  cast for  each 
party  and  seats  are  distributed  according  to  the  number 
of  times  this  quotient  is  contained  in  each  party's  total. 
In  1967  the parties  taking  part in the election  scored  the 
totals shown in Figure  l(d). 
It is  obviously unlikely that this  quotient will divide into 
any  party's  total  exactly,  i.e.  without  remainder;  further-
more, if there are remainders of votes there must, by defini-
tion, be remainders of seats (8  in 1967).  The question now 
arises how are these remaining seats to be distributed?  One 
way would be to reward parties according to whichever had 
the  highest  remainder;  this  is  not  favoured  because  it 
leaves  too much to chance.  A  fairer  procedure is  the one 
followed  in  the  Netherlands, whereby  remaining  seats  are 
allocated  on  the  basis  of  the  "highest  average".  The 
procedure  sounds  complicated  but  is  really  very  simple. 
The total votes cast for each party are first  divided  by the 
number of seats that have been allocated to it so far.  The 
results of these division  sums  will  show one party to have 
the highest average votes per seat. This party now receives 
the first of the 8 remaining seats. When this has been done, 
of course,  this  party's  average  will  drop.  The next seat is 
given  to  the  party which  now  has  the highest  average  of 
votes per seat; this process is repeated until all the remain-
ing seats have been filled.  In 1967  election the 8 remaining 
seats  were  distributed  between  the parties  as  follows: 
Catholic 
Labour 
Liberal 
3  Anti-Revolutionary 
2  Democrats'66 
1 
3  The  figures  in  this  example  are  taken  from  the  last  mentioned 
work  by Robert Senelle  on p.  51.  Senelle  also  gives  on pp.  51  and  52 
an  explanation  of  the  detailed  procedures  for  the  allocation  of  seats 
to  list  alliances. This brought final party strengths in the Second Chamber 
to the totals below: 
Party  Seats 
Catholic Peoples Party (KVP)  42 
Labour Party (Socialists) (PVDA)  37 
Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (Liberals) 
(VVD)  17 
Anti-Revolutionary  Party  (ARP)  15 
Christian Historical Union (CHU)  12 
Democracy '66  7 
Agrarian Party  7 
Communist Party (CPN)  5 
Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)  4 
Calvinist Political Party (SGP)  3 
Calvinist Political Union (GPV)  1 
150 
There  can  be  no  questioning  the  fairness  of the  Dutch 
electoral  system  but of course  this  is  not  the  only  con-
sideration. Small, newly formed parties can easily enter the 
contest  and  sometimes  with  one  or  two  seats.  Of  the 
23  parties  which  fought  the  1967  election,  11  secured 
representation in the Second Chamber. In the 1971  election 
just held, 29  parties entered lists and 14  secured representa-
tion.  Many  of these  parties  are  little  more  than  pressure 
groups using elections as another channel of influence. Even 
though  there is  a  deposit  system  for  discouraging  parties 
with little  support, it is  still  difficult  to  keep  the numbers 
down.  The  all-time  record  was  in  1933  when  54  parties 
entered  lists.  However,  notwithstanding  the  multiplicity  of 
parties,  the  Netherlands  is  generally  considered  to  be  a 
stable country. Whenever a  cabinet is  forced  to resign  for 
some  reason,  the  ensuing  crisis  does  not  have  the  same 
disruptive effect on the country's domestic and international 
life that was frequently the case in Fourth-Republic France. 
Luxembourg 
Although smaller than the Netherlands, Luxembourg has 
not  followed  her  in  treating  the  whole  country  as  one 
constituency  in  the  electoral  system.  The  country  has  a 
single-chamber  legislature  containing  only  56  seats.  These 
are divided into  four constituencies-Central 18,  South 23, 
North 9  and East 6.  It is  not necessary  for the parties  to 
enter  lists  in  all  constituencies,  although  in  1968  all  five 
of  them  in  fact  did  so.  The  voter  is  allowed  to  cast  as 
many votes as there are seats to be filled in his constituency, 
he can spread these over more than one party list and can 
also  give  up  to  two  votes  to  any  one  candidate.  When 
the count begins seats are allocated in each constituency and 
there is  no carrying over of remainders from one constitu-
ency  to  the next.  Proportionality  over  the  whole  country 
is  thus  not secured.  The  procedure  followed  at the  count 
is  nearly  the  same  within  a  Luxembourg  constituency  as 
it is  in the Netherlands over the whole country. The only 
variation  is  that  instead  of  obtaining  the  "quotient"  by 
dividing the number of votes cast by the number of seats 
to  be  filled,  the formula is 
Total votes cast 
1  Seats to be filled  +  · 
However,  thereafter  the  procedure  is  identical,  with 
remaining  seats  being  allocated  according  to  the  principle 
of the "highest average". 
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Italy 
The  electoral  system  used  for  the  Italian  lower  house 
(Chamber  of  Deputies)  is  especially  interesting  because 
it  attempts  to  get  the  best  of  both  worlds  between  the 
methods used  in  the Netherlands and Luxembourg.  While 
the  country  is  divided  into  multi-member  constituencies, 
this  does  not have  the  distorting  effect  on proportionality 
one  would  imagine  because  the  remainders  of  votes  are 
placed  in  a  national  "pool"  and  a  further  proportional 
distribution is  made. While the voter is  confronted with  a 
party  list,  he  is  allowed  to  express  individual  preference 
for  five  names  and can also  strike  out the names  of any 
candidates  to  whom he is  personally  opposed.  In practice 
few  voters  take advantage of either of these facilities. 
Italy arrives  at its  electoral "quotient" in each constitu-
ency by dividing  the total votes cast for all parties by the 
number  of  seats  to be  filled  plus  two.  After  making  an 
initial  distribution  of seats  by  then  dividing  this  quotient 
into  each  party's  total,  the  remainders  of both votes  and 
seats  are  transferred  to  a  national  "pool".  At  this  stage 
only those  parties  which  have  won at least one seat in a 
constituency  and  300,000  votes  in  the  whole  country  are 
eligible for any of the remaining seats. For this distribution 
the  straightforward  Hare  Method  is  used  for  arriving  at 
the "quotient" for the national "pool" i.e. 
Total votes carried over 
Remaining  seats  to  be  filled 
Any  seats  still  not  allocated  after  this  second  share  out 
has taken place are distributed  on the basis of the  highest 
remainder. 
Conclusions 
There  has  only  been  space  in  this  article  to  cover  the 
broad essentials of these seven electoral systems. There are 
further  interesting  differences  in  the  minor  details  and 
sometimes  a  different  system  is  used  for  the upper  house 
of the legislature in the same country. But however fascinat-
ing  the  mechanisms  themselves  may be,  the actual  choice 
of a  particular electoral system is  itself a  political act. No 
country  cliooses  a  particular  method  without  a  careful 
eye on the likely consequences. In taking up their positions 
at the  time  of the initial  choice of system the parties are 
naturally  keenly  aware  of  how  they  themselves  will  be 
affected. 
Moreover,  it is  a  mistake  to expect too  much  from  an 
electoral  system  in  the  shaping  of  a  country's  political 
life.  Electoral  systems  can  help  to  "nudge"  the  political 
waves  in  one direction or another, but they cannot create 
or indeed stem a  :flood  tide. 
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